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ABSTRACT
This work explains and evaluates the actors and processes at work in the industry of
raising equity capital for affordable housing using the low income housing tax credit
("LIHC"), and the relationships between the actors and processes. The particular
focus is on the role of corporate investors, which have, in the past 24 months, become
the dominant source of equity capital in the industry.
There are three principal reasons why an industry analysis of the housing tax credit
industry is of particular interest. First, a substantial majority of the measurable
affordable multifamily housing starts in the United States are financed, in part, by
equity raised with Federal tax credits. Second, although the industry is important to
achieving the nation's housing objectives, the industry is unusual and fairly complex.
As a result, the industry is not well understood, even by participants in the industry.
Third, the industry is currently undergoing rapid change and evolution.
The thesis begins by providing a brief discussion of the multifamily housing market
and policy contexts for the LIHC. The history and provisions of the LIHC program
are summarized. An overview of the housing tax credit industry is provided. The two
major submarkets which make up the housing tax credit industry are the equity
capital market, in which intermediaries raise capital from investors, and the property
market, in which intermediaries invest capital with developers into properties which
generate tax credits. The equity capital market and the property market are each
described. Then, the housing tax credit industry is described and analyzed. The two
submarkets are again drawn together to form a complete picture of the industry as
a system.
The principal aims of the work are threefold: first, to illustrate the elements of
industry structure in the housing tax credit industry; second, to develop an
industrywide perspective which shows the interrelationships between various parts
of the industry and allows us to see the industry as a system; and third, to discuss
and understand how the dynamics of the industry operate.
There are three principal conclusions. First, some of the major participants in the
equity capital market - corporate investors and brokers - did not have an adequate
understanding of the industry as a system and therefore did not understand the
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system-wide implications of their decision to invest large sums of capital with many
intermediary firms. The dynamics of the industry structure rapidly led to lower yields
for investors and lower profits for brokers, results which they did not anticipate.
Second, the investment of large sums of capital has transformed the equity capital
market in the past twenty-four months. The types of investors and products have
changed substantially. The pace of change is still rapid. Third, this transformation
has not only changed the equity capital market, but has substantially changed the
economics of the industry and the LIHC program. The efficiency of the program, from
a public policy point of view, has substantially improved.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Joseph Ferreira, Jr.
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Operations Research
Page 4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to express his profound gratitude for the guidance,
assistance, and understanding of Joe Ferreira. Joe's help and support was essential
to completing this work. Sandy Welford deserves many thanks for her understanding
as well, for the patience which she has shown me and so many other students, and
for helping me get out of the administrative tangles which I got myself into. Finally,
my heartfelt thanks go to the many members of the Department of Urban Studies and
Planning who have provided advice, assistance and encouragement over many years,
and who helped me find my way at MIT.
The opinions expressed in this work are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of any firm or individual discussed herein.
Page 5
Page 6
Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Introduction ...................................
The Low-Income Housing Credit in Context:
Housing Market Conditions and Policy Considerations
2.1 Multifamily Rental Housing Production .........
2.2 Housing Supply and Demand ................
2.3 Subsidies for Housing Production .............
2.4 Policy Considerations and the Low-Income Housing
Chapter 3. A History and Summary of the Low-Income
Housing Credit Program ................ ............. 23
Earlier Tax Incentives for Affordable Housing ....
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 .................
The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit ...........
An Example of a Typical Development ..........
Chapter 4. An Overview of the Housing Tax Credit Industry
4.1 An Overview ........................
4.2 The Property Market and the Equity Capital
........ 43
Market ...........
Chapter 5. The Equity Capital Market ........................... .49
5.1 Syndication of Tax Credit Investments ...................... 49
5.2 The Actors in the Equity Capital Market ..................... .55
5.2.1 Investors ...................................... 55
5.2.2 Intermediaries .................................. 63
5.2.3 Channels ...................................... 66
5.3 Market Trends in the Equity Capital Market .................. 67
Chapter 6. The Property Market ................................ 79
6.1 Developers ............................................ 79
6.2 Interm ediaries ......................................... 82
6.3 Typical Agreements Between Intermediaries and Developers ...... 84
6.4 Relationships and Competition in the Property Market .......... 88
Page 7
Chapter 2.
..9
... 13
.... 13
.... 15
.... 18
.... 20Credit
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
23
25
27
39
Chapter 7. An Analysis of the Housing Tax Credit Industry
7.1 Segm entation ......................................... .92
7.2 Understanding the Competitive Environment ................. .96
7.2.1 Industry Life Cycle .............................. 96
7.2.2 Competitive Forces .............................. 97
7.2.3 Entry ........................................ 99
7.2.4 Rivalry Among Firms ........................... .107
7.3 Strategic Map of the Equity Capital Market ................. .108
7.4 Industry Groups ...................................... 111
Chapter 8. The Housing Tax Credit Industry as a System .......... 113
8.1 A Systems View ....................................... 113
8.1.1 The Importance of a Systems View ................... .116
8.1.2 The Limited Size of the Property Market .............. 117
8.2 The Rise of Corporate Investors ........................... .118
8.3 Effects of Large Scale Investment by Corporate Investors ....... .125
8.3.1 The Decline of the Individual Investor ................ 126
8.3.2 Changes in Products, Distribution Channels, and Pricing 130
8.3.3 Convergence of the Equity Capital Market and
the Property Market .............................. 134
8.3.4 Increasing Sophistication .......................... 135
8.3.5 Economics and Efficiency of the Program .............. 137
8.4 The Status of the Tax Credit Industry ...................... 142
8.4.1 Is the Tax Credit Program Achieving Its Objectives? . . . . . . 142
8.4.2 Risks of an Investment in Tax Credits ................ 144
8.5 Possible Future Developments in the Industry ................ 147
Chapter 9. Conclusion ........................................ 153
Bibliography ................................................. 161
Page 8
.. .. .. . .. 91
Chapter 1
Introduction
This work explains and evaluates the actors and processes at work in the industry of
raising equity capital for affordable housing using the low income housing tax credit
("LIHC"), as well as the relationships between the actors and processes. The
particular focus is on the role of corporate investors, which have, over the past twenty-
four months, become the dominant source of equity capital in the industry.
There are three principal reasons why an industry analysis of the housing tax
credit industry is of particular interest. First, a substantial majority of the
measurable affordable multifamily housing starts in the United States are financed,
in part, by equity raised with Federal tax credits. Overall Federal expenditures on
other housing programs have been sharply reduced in the past decade. The LIHC
program has become the nation's principal program for generating new affordable
housing production.
Second, although the industry is important to achieving the nation's housing
objectives, the industry is unusual and fairly complex. As a result, the industry is not
well understood, even by participants in the industry. In part, that is because this is
a relatively young industry. The low income housing tax credit was created by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the program became effective January 1, 1987.
Substantial sales to corporations were not achieved until late 1992. In effect, the
industry has not yet matured.
Another reason why the industry is not well understood has to do with the
legislative history. The program was initially given a three year term. Congress later
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passed three separate extensions. Because of the uncertainty about whether the
program would continue, the industry has not been well analyzed. Congress recently
made the housing tax credit permanent.
The third reason why an analysis of the industry is of interest is that the
industry is currently undergoing rapid change and evolution. The process of
maturation is beginning. Largely as a result of the increased investment by
corporations, the industry has changed tremendously during the past 24 months, and
more change is coming. The future of the industry will be shaped by market and
competitive forces.
Viewing the industry as a system is a particularly useful approach, for two
reasons. First, although the industry is unusual and complex, its scope can be fairly
well defined and the important subsystems can be defined. (By subsystem or
submarket I mean a portion of the overall industry system which can be delineated
functionally from other portions of the industry.) Furthermore, the industry is to
some degree a closed system, because there is a limited amount of tax credit which
is authorized each year. For these reasons, it lends itself to a systems view.
There is a second reason why a systems view is effective. Part of the reason
why the industry is not well understood is because many of its participants tend to
have a "local" view - that is, a view which is limited to the actors with which they
have immediate contact. Individual industry participants appear to operate without
an understanding of how the actions of all industry participants interact and
indirectly influence each other. This is precisely the sort of system which can have
dynamics that are unpredictable in the context of any particular subsystem and may
therefore be surprising to industry participants.
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Chapter 2 discusses the current multifamily housing market, and briefly
discusses some of the policy considerations around the LIHC program. The broader
market and policy issues provide a context for understanding the housing tax credit
program and industry.
Chapter 3 briefly outlines the history of the tax credit program and
summarizes the material provisions of the law and regulations. These define the
Federal low income housing credit program and influence key characteristics of the
industry. This provides the reader with the necessary background to understand the
chapters which follow.
Chapter 4 is a brief overview of the housing tax credit industry, to provide an
overall perspective. This chapter also defines the two major submarkets which make
up the housing tax credit industry: the equity capital market, in which intermediaries
raise capital from investors; and the property market, in which intermediaries invest
capital with developers into properties which generate tax credits.
In Chapters 5 and 6, the equity capital market and the property market are
each described. In addition, the actors in the industry are generally described.
In summary, within the equity capital market one set of actors is investors.
In a broad sense, there are individual investors and corporate investors. The principal
focus is on describing the corporate investors. These investors have clearly come to
dominate the market in the past 24 months. In addition, they are somewhat more
complex actors than individual investors. Generally the funds raised in the capital
market flow through a second set of actors, referred to herein as channels (that is,
channels of distribution). These channels include broker/dealer firms, such as Wall
Street firms and regional broker/dealers; specialty firms who focus on selling this
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particular product; and individuals who operate as brokers or "finders." Finally, the
intermediaries who package and sponsor these investments also function in part in
the equity capital market. These intermediaries include both for-profit and non-profit
entities.
The funds raised in the capital market are put to work in the property market,
where they are exchanged for ownership interests in particular property investments.
One set of actors provides the funds to the property market. These include the
intermediaries as well as, to a limited degree, finders. The other principal set of
actors is the developers. Developers have the responsibility for selecting and
initiating property developments. They obtain equity capital by selling a portion of
their ownership interests to the intermediaries. The primary emphasis of this work
is on understanding the equity capital market and the industry as a whole, so the
discussion of the property market in Chapter 6 is limited to the extent needed to
achieve that understanding.
In Chapter 7, the housing tax credit industry is described and analyzed, again
with an emphasis on the equity capital market in general and corporate investors in
particular. Drawing upon developed techniques of industry and competitive analysis,
notable features of the industry will be highlighted and explored.
Chapter 8 draws the detailed view of the two submarkets together to form a
complete picture of the industry as a system. Some implications and observations
regarding the industry are discussed. This chapter will also make observations as to
the history of the industry, policy implications of industry structure, and trends.
Finally, a brief summary of the principal conclusions and areas for further
research will be presented.
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Chapter 2
The Low Income Housing Credit in Context:
Housing Market Conditions and Policy Considerations
Congress created the low-income housing tax credit in order to encourage the
production of rental housing which is affordable to low-income households. Therefore,
to understand the LIHC program, it is essential to begin with some context. This
chapter discusses the current condition of the rental housing market, and outlines
some of the basic policy considerations surrounding the program.
Section 2.1 Multifamily Rental Housing Production
Production of rental housing has varied dramatically in the past decade. (See
Figure 2-1, Multifamily Rental Housing Starts.) Recent years have seen a dramatic
drop to historically low levels. Production fell from a peak of 515,000 units in 1985
to just 117,000 starts in 1993. Multifamily starts "hit a 35-year low in 1991 and are
still restrained ... Current production levels are insufficient to replace units lost to
demolition or conversion, and multifamily inventory actually declined in 1991 and
1992."12 This is the first time since World War II that the number of rental units has
declined from one year to the next.3
1 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Construction Reports, Series C-20, Housing Starts, in
Housing Market Statistics, April 1994, p. 19.
2 Real Estate Research Corporation and Equitable Real Estate Investment
Management, Inc., "Property Types in Perspective," Real Estate Report, Volume 22,
No. 4, 1993, p. 14.
3 "Rental Squeeze Hurts Low Income Tenants," The Wall Street Journal, December 3,
1991.
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Figure 2-1
Multifamily Rental Housing Starts
Privately owned units.
Source: US Bureau of the Census,
Construction Reports, Series C-20, Housing
Starts, in Housing Market Statistics, April
1994, p. 19.
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It appears that 1991-1993 represents the bottoming out of the trend and that
production will slowly trend upward. The housing tax credit program is an important
reason why:
The multifamily housing market ended 1993 in far better shape than
it entered the year. The first quarter of 1993 was the worst since the
inception of multifamily housing start statistics, with a seasonally
adjusted annual rate of a mere 134,000 units. By the fourth quarter
this had increased to 186,000 units, an increase of 39 percent. The
prospects for 1994 and 1995 appear to be better, with strengthening of
the economy and the low income housing tax credit (LIHTC) kicking in.
... [However,] production is still rnnning around 40 percent below the
300,000-unit level, a level that was once thought to be a floor that the
market could not fall below."
The issuance of building permits rose dramatically in late 1993. As a result,
economists are forecasting that multifamily construction will rise to 200,000 units
annually for 1994. "This is largely due to the renewal of the low income housing tax
credit. ... the multifamily market appears to have finally turned the corner, and begun
a period of modest, but nonetheless, positive growth. Government assistance, in the
form of the LIHTC has been essential to this turnaround." '
Section 2.2 Housing Supply and Demand
Of course, housing production is only the supply side of the equation for the
rental housing market. It is worth reviewing the supply/demand balance as well,
which is influenced both by current levels of demand as well as historical levels of
4 D'Allessandris, David, "Multifamily Housing Activity," Housing Economics, Volume
XXXXII, No. 3, March 1994, pp. 15.
* D'Allessandris, David, "Multifamily Housing Activity," Housing Economics, Volume
XXXXII, No. 3, March 1994, pp. 16.
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Figure 2-2
Rental Starts and Vacancy
1980 1982 1984
-- H HHdz
1986 1988 1990 1992
1 | Starts --- Vacancy
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Construction Reports, Series C-20, Housing
Starts, in Housing Market Statistics, April, 1994, p. 19; and U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Construction Reports, Series H-111, Housing
Vacancies and Homeownership, in Housing Market Statistics, April,
1994, p. 39.
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supply. As Figure 2-2 illustrates, at least part of the reason why housing production
is down is the market's response to the oversupply of multifamily housing in general.
The relatively high levels of production in the mid-1980s led to rising vacancy rates.
Those vacancy rates have remained at relatively high levels until very recently.
However, "the overall rental vacancy rate fell to an eight year low of 6.9 percent
during the fourth quarter of 1993."'
Vacancy statistics are often used to suggest that there is no need for housing
production programs. Of course, these statistics measure nationwide vacancy, but
housing is a locally supplied commodity. Furthermore, these statistics measure broad
market vacancy rates, but do not reflect the balance of supply and demand in the
affordable segment of the housing market.
The downturn in the rental housing market has received a great deal
of attention from housing market analysts and in the popular press. In
the first half of the 1980s, multifamily construction was buoyed not only
by the overall expansion of the economy but also by extremely favorable
treatment under the federal tax code. There is no doubt that
construction activity ran well ahead of demand in many parts of the
country, and in some places, it oversaturated the market. But although
there is an oversupply of rental units in many markets, it is important
to note that much of that surplus is at the high end. In many markets,
there is a strong demand for but an insufficient supply of good-quality,
low-cost units for low- and moderate-income households.7
The Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University reports that, even
with the weakness in the national economy and the low levels of production, rents
remain close to their highest historical levels, and rents as a fraction of income hit a
6 Housing Market Statistics, April 1994, p. 5.
' Denise DiPasquale and Jean L. Cummings, "Financing Multifamily Rental Housing:
The Changing Role of Lenders and Investors," Housing Policy Debate, Volume 3, Issue
1, 1992, p. 85.
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25-year high in 1992.8 They attribute this, in part, to continued losses in the stock
of affordable housing. "[D]espite a 33% increase in the overall inventory of rental
housing since 1974, the stock of affordable units (subsidized and low-cost unsubsidized
units combined) has steadily eroded."' There were fewer affordable housing units
nationwide in 1991 than there were in 1974. Clearly, then, providing affordable
housing is an issue which should remain on the nation's political agenda.
Section 2.3 Subsidies for Housing Production
As many observers have noted, Federal housing subsidies for producing new
housing units have been substantially reduced since 1980. For example, the number
of new or rehabilitated units funded through the programs of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development fell from 215,000 units in 1980 to 20,000 units in
1993.1" The Section 8 production program, which produced several hundred
thousand new affordable units during the 1970's and early 1980's, was eliminated
under the Reagan administration. In general, the Section 8 subsidy program became
a tenant-based rental subsidy program rather than a new production program. Other
than the low income housing tax credit, no major new housing production programs
have been implemented.
8 Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, The State of the Nation's
Housing 1993, Cambridge, 1993, p. 3.
9 Joint Center for Housing Studies, p. 15.
10 Cushing N. Dolbeare, At a Snail's Pace, FY1995, Low Income Housing Information
Service, Washington, D.C., March 1994, Graph 12.
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Many state governments are active in housing programs, and play a central
role in the housing tax credit program, as will be discussed in Chapter 3.
Most states administer their housing programs through state line
agencies, state housing finance agencies (HFAs), or both. HFAs
promote a state's housing goals mostly by issuing tax-exempt bonds
backed by mortgages and by allocating federal tax credits to for-profit
and non-profit developers. In addition to these federally supported
programs, many HFAs have made enough money off of past
investments to establish unsecured agency reserve accounts and use
them to fund a variety of specialized housing programs. ... Line agencies
typically administer the CDBG program and DOE's home weatheriza-
tion program. Some of these agencies also administer HUD Section 8
and public housing assistance. In about 20 states, they also administer
the HOME program. 1
At one time, it was thought that state and local governments might become more
active in funding affordable housing production. "Some observers hope ... that
increases in state funding will compensate for cuts in incremental federal housing
assistance."" However, state expenditures on housing remain low. Most states
spend less than $2 per capita annually on housing and community development.
Between 1985 and 1990, federal expenditures on housing and community development
rose by 21.8%, in real terms. In fiscal year 1990, of total governmental expenditures
on housing and community development (net of tax expenditures and expenditures for
loans), Federal spending accounted for 82%, local spending for 14%, and state
spending for only 4%. Note that these amounts do not include tax expenditures, such
" Belsky, Eric S., "The States and Housing Assistance," Housing Economics, Volume
XXX1, No. 5, May 1993, pp. 6.
1 Belsky, Eric S., "The States and Housing Assistance," Housing Economics, Volume
XXX1, No. 5, May 1993, pp. 5.
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as the low-income housing tax credit, so the percentages actually understate the
proportion of spending which flows from Federal sources.
State and local governments assist in many ways in facilitating the provision
of housing. However, clearly state and local governments are not becoming, by
themselves, a significant source of new production for affordable housing.
Section 2.4 Policy Considerations and the Low-Income Housing Credit
As with many Federal housing programs, there has been debate about whether
the low-income housing credit is the best vehicle for meeting the nation's housing
needs. Of course, there is great debate about the relative priority of the many
programs contending for scarce Federal budget dollars. More narrowly, however,
there has also been debate about in what manner Federal housing funds should be
used. This debate has three major dimensions. First, there is a debate about
production programs as opposed to tenant-based subsidy programs. In other words,
should subsidies be provided to produce new rental housing, or should rent subsidies
should be provided to tenants who would then go into the market and find housing?
William Apgar responded to that question as follows:
The recent increase in market rents challenges the proposition that
demand subsidies are a cost-effective method of housing assistance.
First, rent increases have raised the cost of subsidizing households
through the use of the existing stock and have made new construction
programs relatively more attractive. In addition, by expanding the
supply of rental housing, subsidized new construction programs may
limit future rent increases, benefiting not only recipients, but others in
the form of reduced rent payments. Although overlooked in recent
housing policy literature, the price effects of housing supply programs
may be important and certainly must be included in any complete
assessment of alternative housing assistance approaches. ... Rather
than continue the futile debate as to whether future housing assistance
efforts should involve mostly vouchers or mostly production subsidies,
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the nation would do well to undertake the business of developing
flexible programs that offer appropriate choices to state and local
decision makers."
Second, production programs can be delivered through direct expenditures of Federal
dollars, or through tax expenditures such as the LIHC. There have been many
arguments made about the relative efficiency, in practice, of these alternative
approaches. Third, there is much debate about the roles of the Federal government,
state and local governments, non-profit groups, and for-profit developers.
Not only must the policy considerations be balanced, but housing programs
must also face political and operational realities. What programs will be able to
obtain funding? Which programs will actually deliver a supply of well-managed
affordable housing for tenants?
While the debate can and should continue, there are three facts which help to
put that debate into context. First, expenditures for the low-income housing credit
program are relatively small. The maximum annual cost to the Treasury is about $3.2
billion. (That is, $1.25 per capita for each of the 255 million residents of the United
States, times 10 years.) To put that figure in context, the incentives for
homeownership provided by allowing the deduction of interest on home mortgages
costs the Federal Treasury approximately $41 billion annually. Furthermore, the
Federal government estimates that 85% of that benefit went to the most affluent
quarter of American taxpayers." Second, the low-income housing credit is currently
* William C. Apgar, Jr., "Which Housing Policy Is Best?," Housing Policy Debate, 1:1,
p. 17, 28.
" Jason DeParle, "Report to Clinton Sees Vast Extent of Homelessness," The New York
Times, February 17, 1994, p. Al.
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delivering a significant amount of affordable housing. Since the inception of the
program in 1987, approximately 600,000 units have been produced, including both
newly constructed units and rehabilitated units. At full utilization, the program
produces between 100,000 and 120,000 such units each year. In recent years the
LIHC program has been responsible for approximately 85% of total multifamily rental
housing production in the United States and an estimated 94% of affordable rental
housing production.15 The program has been successful in delivering housing to the
target population of the program. Finally, no alternative Federal production program
has been identified. Until a substitute program is established and fully implemented,
it would be wise to continue the housing tax credit program.
1 The latter figure is from Nick Ravo, "One of the Last Great Shelters," The New York
Times, February 27, 1994.
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Chapter 3
A History and Summary of the Low Income Housing Credit Program
In order to understand the housing tax credit industry, it is necessary to first
understand the low income housing credit (LIHC) program itself. The LIHC program
is a creation of Federal legislation and regulations.' This body of laws and
regulations together define the program. In addition, the specific features and
characteristics of the program have significant implications which influence key
characteristics of the housing tax credit industry. This chapter will summarize the
material and relevant provisions of the law and regulations, and interpret and discuss,
to the extent necessary to understand the industry, the implications of those laws and
regulations.
Section 3.1 Earlier Tax Incentives for Affordable Housing
"[The] trend of U.S. tax policy since the end of World War II had been to
expand old preferences and to introduce new ones to achieve various economic and
social objectives."2 Until the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the Federal tax code included
a variety of incentives to construct real estate in general and affordable housing in
particular. The two most significant incentives were as follows.
' Congress, of course, passes the legislation. This legislation is then interpreted and
implemented by the regulations and rulings issued by the Internal Revenue Service
of the Department of the Treasury.
2 Joseph A. Pechman, "Tax Reform: Theory and Practice", in Eleanor Brown (ed.),
Readings, Issues and Questions in Public Finance, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood,
Illinois, 1988, p. 171.
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Deduction of Interest and Taxes during Construction. Prior to 1976 (for all real
estate) and after 1981 (for low-income housing), interest and real estate tax payments
incurred during the construction period were deductible. This provided substantial
deductions, which were of particular value in attracting investment because they were
available during the initial years.
Accelerated Depreciation. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 created the
Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) for depreciation. All property was
depreciable over 15 years. In addition, for low-income housing 200% declining balance
depreciation, a form of accelerated depreciation, was available. Rehabilitation
expenditures for low-income housing could be amortized over five years.
Note that the 1981 tax act provided significant incentives for real estate, as
well as serving as a stimulus for other economic activity. Figure 2-1, if reviewed
keeping in mind the stimulative effect of the 1981 tax act and the removal of
incentives in the 1986 tax act, is a useful illustration of the effect of tax policy on
housing production. "In fact, particularly in the last decade, federal tax policy has so
dominated the underlying economics of rental housing deals that many analysts have
concluded that rental housing investments have been tax driven."'
3 Denise DiPasquale and Jean L. Cummings, "Financing Multifamily Rental Housing:
The Changing Role of Lenders and Investors," Housing Policy Debate, Volume 3, Issue
1, 1992, p. 86.
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Section 3.2 The Tax Reform Act of 1986
"The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is the most significant piece of tax legislation
enacted since the income tax was converted to a mass tax during World War II."'
The 1986 tax act eliminated many exemptions from tax as well as many deductions
and credits that were used to reduce taxable income and tax.
In particular, for individual investors, the ability to use losses and tax credits
from certain investments to offset other income was substantially eliminated.' The
1986 act created the concept of passive activities, which are trade or business
activities in which the taxpayer does not materially participate. Losses from passive
activities generally cannot be used to offset income from other sources such as wages,
salaries, and portfolio investments (for example, stocks or bonds). Any rental activity
is considered a passive activity, as are all activities engaged in as a limited partner.
At the same time, Congress eliminated accelerated depreciation for real
property and substantially lengthened the periods for depreciating real property.
Residential real estate was to be depreciated over 27.5 years and all other real estate
was to be depreciated over 31.5 years. (The 1993 tax act extended the depreciable life
for non-residential real estate to 39 years.)
Finally, individual and corporate tax rates were substantially reduced. This
had the effect of reducing the value of tax deductions. However, because the
* Pechman, p. 170.
* The discussion in this chapter about the specific provisions of the program is based
in part upon the following sources: Housing and Development Reporter Reference File,
Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Boston, 1993 and 1994, pp. 80:0011-28 and 81:011-30;
and Boston Financial Securities, Inc., Confidential Memorandum, Boston Financial
Institutional Tax Credits VII, 1994, pp. 62-81.
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limitations on the use of losses from passive activities substantially eliminated the use
of losses by individuals, this was material principally for corporations. (The maximum
corporate tax rate was reduced from 46% to 34%.)
These provisions obviously substantially eliminated all of the incentives in the
tax code for the production of real estate, and particularly for the production of
affordable housing. The notable exceptions to this statement were the low-income
housing tax credit and the rehabilitation tax credit.' Individuals were allowed to
annually offset up to $25,000 of income using these credits. (For example, an
individual in the 28% tax bracket could use 28% times $25,000, or $7,000 per year of
tax credit.) Corporations were allowed to use losses and credits without limit, subject
to the provisions of the alternative minimum tax which required a minimum level of
tax payments by each corporation.
The low income housing credit program was created by the Tax Reform Act of
1986. Internal Revenue Code Section 42 provides a tax credit for owners of qualified
low-income housing properties, which are placed into service after December 31, 1986.
The staff of the Senate Finance Committee had interesting comments on their motives
for the creation of the housing tax credit:
[A] more efficient mechanism for encouraging the production of low-
income rental housing can be designed than the variety of subsidies
existing under present law. ... These subsidies operate in an
uncoordinated manner, result in subsidies unrelated to the number of
6 The rehabilitation tax credit is an incentive for restoring residential and commercial
properties, generally properties which are on the National Register of Historic Places,
in historic districts, or were originally constructed prior to 1936. Individuals with
direct ownership of real estate can also utilize up to $25,000 of deductions, in certain
circumstances.
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low-income individuals served, and fail to guarantee that affordable
housing will be provided to the most needy low-income individuals. 7
Congress noted that, in former subsidy programs, income ceilings at 80% of median
income were relatively high when compared with the income of typical renters;
household incomes were not adjusted for family size; none of the existing tax subsidies
limited the rents which could be charged; and the degree of subsidy was not linked to
the number of units serving low-income tenants.
Section 3.3 The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
Section 42 of the tax code, and the regulations which interpret it, have a
number of important provisions which give the program, as well as the industry, its
shape.
Tenant Income and Rent Limitations
To qualify for the LIHC, a property must meet one of two tests, typically
referred to as the "set-aside requirement": a minimum of 20% of the apartment units
must be set aside for families with incomes no higher than 50% of the median income
for the area; or a minimum of 40% of the apartments must be set aside for families
with incomes no higher than 60% of median income for the area. Median incomes are
adjusted for family size. In calculating family size, it is assumed that 1.5 persons
occupy each bedroom. (The actual family size was used until 1989, but this proved
unwieldy. For example, because the rent is based on family income, using actual
7 United States Senate, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Report of the Committee on Finance,
Report 99-312, May 29, 1986, p. 758.
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family size provided unintended incentives to rent to the largest possible family, and
it required an increase or decrease in the rent when family size changed.)
Note that the income limits and the family size adjustments achieve an
important policy goal: the subsidy is clearly directed toward the target population.
This was a response to previous tax incentives, which benefitted properties that could
rent to higher income tenants and for which there were no adjustments for family
size. (The practical implication of this latter feature, under the former tax law, was
that a one-person household and a four-person household might qualify at the same
income level, even though their ability to pay was markedly different.)
In addition, rents (including tenant-paid utilities) may not exceed 30% of the
income limit used to qualify (that is, the 50% or 60% of median levels). Further, if
tenants pay for utilities this maximum must reduced by an allowance for the amount
of utilities (other than telephone). Table 3-1 shows, for illustrative purposes, the
maximum monthly housing costs for various metropolitan areas around the country.
The determination of whether tenants are qualified must be repeated annually.
This is in contrast with some of the programs which were eliminated, under which a
tenant needed only to qualify initially. If a tenant's income rises above 140% of the
income limits, that unit will no longer qualify unless the unit remains rent-restricted
and the next vacant unit is rented to a qualifying tenant. Note that, as long as the
rent restriction requirement is met, this provision only has practical effect in a
property which rents less than 100% of its apartments to qualifying tenants, because
in a 100% qualifying property the next apartment will always be rented to a
qualifying tenant. Most properties are 100% qualified; therefore, as a practical matter
tenant incomes may rise with without causing a unit to become nonqualified. This is
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Table 3-1
1993 Median Income for a Family of Three and
Maximum Costs for a Two-Bedroom Apartment for
Selected Metropolitan Statistical Areas
60% of Maximum
Median Monthly
(1) Costs (2)
Atlanta, GA 25,080 627
Boston, MA 27,660 692
Chicago, IL 25,680 642
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 22,920 573
Cleveland, OH 22,860 572
Dallas, TX 24,540 614
Denver, CO 25,080 627
Detroit, MI 25,200 630
Hartford, CT 28,020 701
Houston, TX 22,920 573
Indianapolis, IN 23,100 578
Kansas City, MO-KS 23,340 584
Las Vegas, NV 21,840 546
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 26,100 653
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 19,080 477
Miami-Hialeah, FL 22,620 566
Milwaukee, WI 24,000 600
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 26,760 669
New Orleans, LA 18,180 455
New York, NY 22,500 563
Norfolk-Newport News, VA 21,000 525
Orlando, FL 21,600 540
Philadelphia, PA-NJ 25,140 629
Phoenix, AZ 22A40 561
Portland, OR 21,960 549
Raleigh-Durham, NC 25,080 627
Sacramento, CA 22,980 575
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 21,900 548
San Diego, CA 23,700 593
San Francisco, CA 31,560 789
Seattle, WA 25,920 648
Washington, DC-MD-VA 32,700 818
Notes:
(1) Source: Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1993 Income Limits
for Low and Very Low Families Under the Housing Act of 1937, 1993.
(2) The maximum allowable amount of the rent and utility payments is 30% of the
qualifying income level.
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important to achieving the intent of Congress, which was that tenants not be evicted
in order to maintain the compliance of the property.
It is also important to note that a unit which becomes vacant continues to
qualify for tax credits, as long as reasonable efforts are made to rent the apartment
and it is not rented to a non-qualifying tenant (or, in a property for which less than
100% of the apartments are rented to qualifying tenants, as long as the next available
unit is not rented to a qualifying tenant).
This provision, which helps make the program more workable in practice, is
reflective of much of the overall design of the tax credit program, as it has been
revised through subsequent legislation and regulation since the 1986 act. Similarly,
should a property or a building be lost to a casualty such as fire, the tax credits
continue to be available as long as the building is reconstructed within a reasonable
period of time. Another helpful provision states that, should unintentional violations
of the income or rent guidelines occur, the property has a reasonable period of time
to correct them without triggering recapture of the tax credits.
State Allocation of Tax Credits
In general, tax credits must be allocated to a property by designated state
housing agencies or, in a limited number of areas, local housing agencies. (The
exception is properties which are financed with tax-exempt bonds; those properties are
eligible for a tax credit without an allocation.)
Each state is authorized to allocate to properties in that state a total amount
of tax credit equal to $1.25 for each resident of the state. For example, a state such
as Massachusetts, with an estimated 1993 population of 5,998,000 persons, was
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authorized to allocate $7,497,500 of annual tax credits in 1993. (The amount of tax
exempt bonds that may be issued are also limited within each state.)
The allocating agencies must develop allocation plans which include their
criteria for evaluating projects, as well as a plan for monitoring the properties which
receive allocations for compliance with the regulations of the program. These
allocation plans are intended to ensure that credit is allocated to those proposed
properties which will best address the housing needs of that state most efficiently.
Agencies must evaluate projects so that they do not allocate more tax credit to a
property than is necessary for the property to be feasible. This is an important
feature, in that it helps to limit actual or perceived abuses of the program. State
review improves the efficiency of the program, as well as helping to maintain the
political support needed to see that the program is continued.
States are permitted to carry over credits which are not allocated in a
particular year into the following year. Credits not allocated in that subsequent year
become available for allocation to other states which fully utilized their credits for the
preceding year.
The state allocation process is one of the defining features of the tax credit
program. It reflects the political principles of the 1980s in that it is a decentralized
program. Within the limits of the program, states can make determinations about
what type of housing to allocate credits to, as well as which localities require
additional housing. The different policy agendas of states are clearly reflected in the
different ways in which they implement the program. This is a significant evolution
in Federal housing programs, and will likely serve as a model for future Federal
programs.
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Of course, the state allocation process helps to ensure that only properties
which receive some level of review and which to some degree achieve the policy
objectives of the program are actually awarded credits. This is in sharp contrast to
former housing incentives, which were available to any property which complied with
the tax law guidelines.
However, the critical defining feature is simply the overall limitation on the
amount of tax credit. This has two important implications. First, the cost of the
program to the Federal treasury is limited and predictable. In this era of extreme
budget-consciousness, this is essential to maintaining the political support needed for
the program. Because former housing incentives were available to any property which
met certain guidelines, the cost of the incentives was difficult to predict and often far
exceeded the expectations of Congress.
The second important implication of the limit on the amount of the tax credits
is simply that it limits the size of the program. As will be discussed in subsequent
chapters, this has had a profound effect on the dynamics of the industry, particularly
as increasing amounts of corporate capital have been invested.
Amount and Timing of Tax Credits
The tax credit is generated each year for a ten year period. This period is
referred to as the "credit period." During the first year, the credit must be pro-rated
to reflect, in effect, both the weighted average fraction of the year during which
apartment units were occupied by qualifying tenants and the fraction of units which
were occupied by qualifying tenants. Any credit not available in the first year as a
result of this proration become available in the eleventh year. In most cases,
properties lease over several months and this rule is applied. The tax credits are then
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generated over an eleven year period, with a partial amount in the first and eleventh
years.
The amount of the credit is equal to the product of three factors: the
depreciable basis of the property; the fraction of the property which is rented to
qualifying tenants at restricted rents; and a percentage rate set by the Treasury. (See
the example below.) As a practical matter, the depreciable basis of the property
includes most costs related to the development of the property, including personal
property and developer fees; land and permanent mortgage financing fees are the
major exceptions. For most properties, 100% of the apartments qualify, so that the
"qualified basis" (that is, the depreciable basis times the fraction of the property
rented to qualifying tenants) is equal to the depreciable basis.
The percentage rate is calculated monthly by the Treasury. There are two
percentages: a credit percentage which, over the ten year period if discounted at the
Treasury's borrowing rates, is equal in present value to 70% of the qualifying basis;
and a credit percentage which is equal to 30% of the qualifying basis. For April, 1994,
the percentage is 8.48% for the former credit and 3.63% for the latter. As interest
rates rise (or fall), these percentage amounts are adjusted upwards (or downwards)
to maintain a present value equal to the target 70% or 30% amounts. The 70% credit
is available for new construction or substantial rehabilitation. The 30% credit applies
to costs of acquiring an existing property and to non-substantial rehabilitation costs,
as well as to new construction or substantial rehabilitation if the property also
benefits from certain other Federal subsidies, such as below-market loans or tax-
exempt bond financing. (Note that rental assistance payments, such as Section 8, are
not deemed Federal subsidies for this purpose.)
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A property which qualifies for the 70% present value credit will generate
approximately 233% of the credit that a property which qualifies for the 30% credit
will generate. (That is, 70%/30% = 233%.) The amount of equity capital which a
property will receive is approximately proportional to the amount of tax credit.
Therefore, the 70% present value credit property will attract 233% of the equity
capital of the 30% present value property.
These much larger tax credit therefore equity capital amounts, in most cases,
far outweigh the economic advantages of most Federal financing programs. For
example, the debt service savings on a typical tax-exempt bond financing contribute
much less to the feasibility of a development than would the additional equity. As a
result, the vast majority of properties are structured to take advantage of the 70%
present value credit.
Finally, note that while the credit is referred to as a 70% present value credit
or a 30% present value credit, those present values are calculated at the Treasury's
borrowing rates. As a result, the actual present value of the benefits to any other user
is, of course, less than these stated amounts. Chapter 8 discusses this further, in the
context of evaluating the efficiency of the tax credit as a means of producing affordable
housing.
Effect on Basis of Utilizing Credit
Unlike the historic rehabilitation tax credit, the tax basis of property is not
reduced by the amount of LIHC taken with respect to the property. This has profound
implications for corporate investors. Corporations are measured by using accounting
rules. Specifically, the earnings reported in their financial statements drive their
stock price, which for most public corporations is the single most important measure
Page 34
of their performance. The features of the tax code for the LIHC have ramifications
for the accounting impact on the corporation.
The effect can be explained by comparing the historic tax credit and the low
income housing tax credit. The historic tax credit reduces the tax basis of the
property, which has the effect of generating additional taxable gain upon the sale of
the property. For tax purposes, the gain is equal to the sales price less the basis. All
other things being equal, one dollar less of basis creates one dollar more of taxable
gain. Because of this, a corporate investor who saves one dollar of tax by using a
dollar of historic tax credit incurs a future tax liability on the gain that is created.
That reduces the net benefit of the credit. For example, if the corporation's effective
tax rate is 40%, it saves $1.00 of current tax, but incurs a future tax liability of $0.40.
As a result, it can book only an addition $0.60 of increased earnings.
The LIHC, on the other hand, does not reduce the basis of the property, as
noted above. Therefore, using $1.00 of housing tax credit can generate $1.00 of
increased earnings for a corporation.' This is the fundamental force motivating
corporate investors to provide capital for affordable housing.
Finally, note that tax deductions also generate a tax liability on sale. However,
in contrast to the tax credit, tax deductions (that is, tax losses) merely reduce taxable
income and not tax. Using a dollar of tax deductions saves a corporation only about
$0.40 in taxes, an amount which is offset by the future tax liability which is created.
8 As might be expected, the complete accounting implications are far too complex to
discuss in detail in this work. It is worth noting that, depending on the accounting
methods used by a corporation, $1.00 of housing tax credit may not always result in
$1.00 of increased earnings for a corporation. However, the ability to increase
earnings is a strong draw for corporate investors.
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Therefore, the use of tax deductions will at best have no impact on earnings and may
in some circumstances reduce earnings. This helps to explain why other forms of tax
incentives have been of far less interest to corporations than the housing tax credit
has been.
Compliance and Recapture
The income and rent limitations must be met for a fifteen year period,
beginning with the year in which the tax credit is first claimed. Should the property
cease to qualify during this period, owners lose their ability to receive tax credits and
a portion of the credits received in prior years is recaptured. Note that this, again,
helps to ensure that the housing serves the intended public purpose. Furthermore,
because the program is administered by the Treasury through the income tax system,
they have wide and effective enforcement procedures available.
Extended Restriction to Use as Low-Income Housing
The 1989 tax act which extended the program also substantially modified it.
One of the more significant modifications was the addition of a requirement designed
to increase the likelihood that the property would be utilized as affordable housing for
an extended period of time. In order to qualify for tax credits, a property must be
subject to an agreement which requires that the property be used as low-income
housing for at least an additional 15 year period, or 30 years in total. The owner of
the property may terminate this use restriction after 15 years by offering the property
to the credit allocating agency at a restricted sales price. The sales price is effectively
equal to enough to provide the owners of the property with an amount equal to the
capital invested in the project, adjusted upward for inflation as measured by the
increase in the consumer price index, and adjusted downward by any cash
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distributions received from the project. If the agency is unable to find a buyer, the
extended use restrictions may be terminated.
In addition, the 1989 act added certain tenant protections. Should the
restrictions be terminated, then-existing tenants are permitted to occupy their units
at restricted rents for a period of up to three years. At the earlier of the date the
tenant vacates the apartment or three years, the apartment units become free of the
requirements that they be rented to qualifying tenants at restricted rents.
Expiration of the Program
As originally enacted, the LIHC program had a term of three calendar years.
States' authority to allocate credits began on January 1, 1987 and ended on December
31, 1989. The program was extended, somewhat intermittently, for the following
three years. In November, 1989, the program was extended through 1990. In
November 1990, the program was extended through 1991. In December, 1991 the tax
credit was extended through June, 1992. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993 made the LIHC program permanent in August, 1993. Although the tax credit
program itself had wide political support, the extension was generally part of either
a package of similar provisions or a broad tax bill. As a result, the fate of the
program was tied to other tax provisions. For example, an extension of the tax credit
program was included in a bill passed by Congress but vetoed by President Bush in
October, 1992.
As might be imagined, eleventh hour extensions just before the program was
scheduled to expire, as well as the hiatus in the program from July, 1992 until
August, 1993, have made it difficult for developers and state agencies to plan projects.
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In addition, the pattern of enabling legislation has probably affected the structure of
the housing tax credit industry, as discussed in Chapter 8.
Administration of the LIHC Program
The LIHC program provides a tax incentive for investment in affordable
housing. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, tax incentives for housing
production have been a feature of the tax code for many years. The principal
incentive had been accelerated depreciation, which generated additional tax
deductions for owners of affordable housing.
However, from the 1930s until the 1980s, significant expenditures for housing
production were made through direct expenditures, not tax expenditures. These direct
expenditures were typically administered by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and its predecessor agencies, or by the Farmers Home
Administration (FmHA) of the Department of Agriculture. Generally, these agencies
provided annual operating or financing subsidies to the properties, or provided rental
subsidies to the properties and/or to the tenants. Examples of financing subsidy
programs include the Section 236 and Section 221(d)(3) programs. Examples of rental
subsidy programs include the Section 8 program (which provides for monthly
payments to the owners of the property on behalf of the tenants) and the Farmers
Home Administration Rental Assistance program.
The LIHC marks a significant departure from those past programs, because it
is administered through the tax code by the Department of the Treasury. Failure to
comply with the regulations of the program results in increased tax liability for
investors. Obviously, the Treasury department is in a position to strongly enforce the
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collection of that additional tax liability should they become aware of a failure to
comply with the regulations.
Section 3.4 An Example of a Typical Development
To illustrate the key features of the LIHC program, Tables 3-2 through 3-4
present an example of a sample housing tax credit property. Table 3-2 presents the
development budget for the property, in the form of a sources and uses of funds table.
The provisions of the tax law determine whether the costs incurred to develop a
property are eligible to be included in the calculation of the amount of tax credit. As
shown, the eligible costs are multiplied by the credit percentage to determine the
available amount of tax credit.
Table 3-3 shows the income and expenses for the same sample property. The
maximum monthly rents are calculated, using the requirements discussed above. This
determines the maximum potential amount of income the property can expect.
Finally, Table 3-4 presents the property from the point of view of a corporate
investor. The various benefits of tax credits, tax deductions, and cash flow are shown.
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Table 3-2
Sample Property
Development Budget and Tax Credit Calculation
Investment Partnership
Investor Capital (1) 3,271,342
Fees and Expenses (315,854) -9.66%
Working Capital Reserves (180,488) -5.52%
Net Capital 2,775,000 84.83%
Property Partnership
Capital from Investment Partnership
First Mortgage Loan
Second Mortgage Loan
Other Items
Developer Capital
Total Sources
2,775,000
2,240,000
1,000,000
322,056
319,893
6,656,949
At 9.95%, 30 year amortization.
At 5.0%, 30 year amortization.
Eligible Ineligible
Development Costs
Other Development Costs
Other Items
Permanent Loan Fees
Legal and Organizational
Land
Development Fee
Total Uses
Calculation of Tax Credit
Eligible Basis
Credit Percentage
Maximum Annual Tax Credit
Credit Allocation
Annual Tax Credit
5,120,697
45,400
322,056
22,400
45,000
420,000
5,120,697
5,700
322,056
39,700
22,400
28,000 17,000
420,000
681,396 681,396
6,656,949 6,157,849
92.50%
6,157,849
8.37%
515,412
514,250
514,250
499,100
8.11%
(Lesser of allocation or calculated amount)
Notes:
(1) Investor Capital is discounted to a present value.
(2) Maximum monthly cost is equal to 1/12th of 30% of the maximum income.
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Table 3-3
Sample Property
Income and Expenses
Location: Roanoke, Virginia
Unit Amenities: Two baths, dishwasher, balcony or patio, air conditioning.
Property Amenities: Clubhouse, swimming pool, tot lot.
Notes: 23 units have rents set for 50% of median income tenants.
Calculation of Maximum Rents Under Section 42
Units Bedrooms
19
77
4
2Q
120
Family
Size (1)
3.0
3.0
4.5
4.5
Maximum
Income Income Monthly
Limit Limits Costs (2)
50%
60%
50%
60%
17,600
21,120
20,325
24,390
440
528
508
610
Maximum
Utility Monthly
Allowance Rent
60 380
60 468
70 438
70 540
Property Income and Expenses
Maximum
Monthly Proforma
Units Bedrooms Rent Rent
380
468
438
540
380
405
435
480
Gross Potential Rent
Other Income
Gross Income
Vacancy
Expenses
Replacement Reserves
Net Operating Income
Debt Service
Net Cash Flow
Annual
Income
86,640
374,220
20,880
115.200
596,940
14A00
611,340
(42,794)
(241,142)
(18.990)
308A14
(299,317)
9,097
Notes:
(1) 1.5 persons per bedroom.
(2) Maximum monthly cost is equal to 1/12th of 30% of the maximum income.
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19
77
4
20
120
Table 3-4
Sample Property
Benefits to the Investors
Investor
Year Capital (1)
3,271,342
Fraction
Of Credit
Available
(2)
0%
38%
99%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
62%
1%
5,040,160 2,365,443 157,824
Internal Rate of Return (calculated annually):
Notes:(1) Investor Capital is discounted to a present value.
(2) The Fraction of Credit Available is effectively proportionate to the average
fraction of the property which is occupied by qualified tenants during the year.
(3) The annual amount of tax credit allocable to the investor limited partners is
98.01% of the total amount calculated on Table 3-2.
(4) The Total Benefit is equal to the amount of tax credit plus the amount of
cash flow plus 38% of the amount of the tax deduction. The 38% figure
represents an assumed combined effective Federal and state tax rate.
(5) This table excludes the potential impact of the sale of the property.
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Tax
Credits
(3)
0
192,506
500,516
504,016
504,016
504,016
504,016
504,016
504,016
504,016
504,016
311,510
3,500
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Tax
Deduction
(112,396)
135,815
257,820
244,758
227,999
211,178
206,735
195,052
176,831
160,236
147,375
134,525
118,479
103,967
86,512
70,557
Cash
Flow
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,217
10,546
7,732
10,359
15,238
20,263
25A39
30,770
36,260
Total
Benefit (4)
(42,710)
244,116
598A88
597,024
590,656
584,264
582,575
579,353
581,758
572,638
570,378
377,868
68,785
64,946
63,645
63,072
6,096,852
11.1%
Chapter 4
A Description of the Housing Tax Credit Industry
This chapter provides an overview of the housing tax credit industry. First, the
industry as a whole is discussed. The overall industry is then further delineated into
two sub-markets: the equity capital market, and the property market. The equity
capital market is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The property market is discussed
in detail in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 then uses the material discussed in Chapters 4
through 6 as a basis for analyzing the housing tax credit industry, in particular the
equity capital market.
Section 4.1 An Overview
Figure 4-1 provides an overview of the housing tax credit industry. The figure
shows, in simplified form, the types of economic entities which participate in the
industry. (For convenience, most of the industry participants will hereafter be called
firms.1) There are three major types of firms in the industry: investors,
intermediaries, and developers. Investors and intermediaries often come together
through distribution channels, although not always. Channels are a fourth type of
firm that participates in the industry.
1 Even though some industry participants are individuals or non-profit entities, and as
such might not fully follow the behaviors associated with for-profit firms, for the
purposes of this analysis there are sufficient similarities that the term is useful. For
example, the industry's non-profit participants exhibit revenue-maximizing behaviors
in many respects. Furthermore, the focus of this analysis is the corporate investor,
rather than the individual investor.
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Figure 4-1
An Overview of The Housing Tax Credit Industry
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Investors. There are two major types of investors: individuals, and
corporations. Within these two general groups there are, of course, segments which
have varying needs.
Channels. Intermediaries use distribution channels to raise capital from
investors. In general, individual investors are reached by using the larger broker-
dealer firms, such as Wall Street firms (Merrill Lynch, Dean Witter), regional firms
(Wheat First) or national networks of financial planners. On the other hand, there
are a great variety of ways in which intermediaries reach corporations. The Wall
Street and regional broker-dealers are used to some degree. More typical, though, are
small brokers who specialize in this product. In addition, there are several other
channels used, which are discussed further in Chapter 5. It is worth noting that some
firms use no channel to reach corporate investors. In particular, the non-profit
syndicators (Local Initiatives Support Corporation, The Enterprise Foundation) have
historically not used a formal distribution channel.
Intermediaries. There are a variety of intermediaries which participate in the
housing tax credit industry. However, a substantial majority of the funds which are
invested by investors flow through an intermediary of a type which fits a fairly
general model. The intermediary forms an investment entity (typically a partnership),
raises capital from a group of investors, and invests that partnership's capital into
another form of asset. In this instance, the assets in which the partnership invests
are in turn limited partnership interests in partnerships which own a property.
(Partnerships and partnership structure are discussed further in Chapter 5.) Both the
for-profit industry participants and the non-profit industry participants fit this model.
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Developers. The industry participants discussed above are all involved in the
portion of the industry which delivers equity capital to developers of qualifying
affordable housing. The developers are involved in a wide range of activities in
connection with the creation of that housing, including the following: feasibility
analysis; site selection and acquisition; zoning and land use approvals; selection and
supervision of the architect and the construction contractor; obtaining the mortgage
financing; obtaining the reservation of tax credit; and, once the property is complete,
managing the property or selecting a management agent.
As indicated by the solid and broken lines in Figure 4-1, to a substantial
degree, the for-profit intermediaries invest with for-profit developers, although there
is a significant amount of investment in properties developed by non-profit developers.
Non-profit intermediaries appear to invest exclusively with non-profit developers. So
to some degree the for-profit sector of both the property market and the equity capital
market are not fully integrated and therefore operate somewhat independently of each
other.
Section 4.2 The Property Market and the Equity Capital Market
While the discussion above provides an overview of the housing tax credit
industry, few industry participants view it in that fashion or operate throughout the
entire industry. For example, developers compete with one another for sites and tax
credit reservations. Developers also communicate with one another, through personal
contacts, trade associations, and industry publications. Obviously, developers and
intermediaries communicate with each other. Intermediaries compete with each other
for the opportunity to invest in developers' projects. On the other hand, developers
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have little, if any, contact with investors and distribution channels, and investors and
distribution channels are not well understood by developers. (The reverse is also
true.) Therefore, there is a natural boundary to the activities in the industry among
the developers and intermediaries. Figure 4-2 delineates that as the property market.
Similarly, there is contact, communication, and competition among investors,
channels and intermediaries. The processes of this portion of the industry are largely
different and appear in some respects to be independent of what goes on in the
property market. Many industry participants see the scope of their own activities as
well-defined within the range of activities engaged in by investors, channels, and
intermediaries. That portion of the industry is referred to herein as the equity capital
market.
Chapter 5 further describes and discusses the equity capital market. Chapter 6
discusses the property market.
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Figure 4-2
An Overview of The Housing Tax Credit Industry
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Chapter 5
The Equity Capital Market
Chapter 4 outlined the concept of an equity capital market within the housing
tax credit industry, as distinct from the property market. This chapter will examine
the equity capital market. The chapter begins with a brief overview of real estate
syndication, the general term for raising capital through intermediaries for investment
in real estate, and some aspects of how it operates in conjunction with the low-income
housing tax credit program. Then the chapter describes in some detail the actors in
the equity capital market. The final section discusses market trends.
Section 5.1 Syndication of Tax Credit Investments
Syndication firms raise capital from investors, typically pool that capital in an
investment entity, and invest that capital in other assets, such as real estate.
Historically, many investors have preferred to invest through syndication firms in
order to utilize the experience and skills of the syndication firm. In addition,
investing through an intermediary can make available to the investor opportunities
to invest in transactions which would otherwise be unavailable to them.
Developers will use syndication firms if they provide a source of capital which
is superior to other alternatives available to them. Tax incentives for housing
production virtually require the use of syndication firms in order to generate equity
capital. The tax benefits must be utilized by an individual or a corporation in order
to have value. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 1986 tax act generally limited the
ability of individuals to use tax benefits, so the individuals involved in development
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cannot typically use the tax benefits. In addition, few development groups are large
enough to use significant amounts of tax benefits. Even for those firms which can use
tax credits, obtaining capital is viewed as far more important than obtaining tax
savings. As a result, a developer will typically seek to allocate as much of the tax
benefit as possible to investors in order to generate the maximum amount of capital.
Real Estate Syndication in Recent Years
In 1988 one observer noted that "the difficulty in the real estate markets,
combined with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, has prompted major dislocation in the
syndication business. A number of participants have been eliminated and new
problems are evolving for those remaining."' Although, in the several years since the
1986 tax act, most of the problems have now surfaced, with the perspective of
hindsight the statement seems very accurate. Capital raised in the industry dropped
dramatically when the 1986 act was adopted, and many of the firms active in the
industry in the mid-1980s have gone bankrupt or otherwise ceased operating in the
industry. The boom in syndication in the early 1980s was due to the passage of the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the liberalization of securities laws, in
particular the passage of Regulation D and the easing of licensing requirements.2
' Steven P. Jarchow, Real Estate Syndication: Securitization After Tax Reform,
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1988, p. vii. The discussion in this section relies in
part upon Jarchow, as well as Housing and Development Reporter Reference
File, pp. 80:0011-28.
2 Jarchow, 1988, p. 4.
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Legal Structure
Every tax credit investment is structured as a limited partnership (or legal
entities which are taxed as limited partnerships for Federal income tax purposes).
The limited partnership is the only entity which, for Federal income tax purposes,
permits the pass-through of tax benefits to the owners. Because the housing tax
credit is a creation of the Federal tax code, and the principal benefit is tax savings,
this is obviously a paramount consideration.
Types of partners. Ordinarily, a limited partnership has two general classes
of owners, limited partners and general partners. The limited partners typically
provide substantially all of the capital required for the partnership. To maintain
limited partnership status, and in particular to retain protection from the general
liabilities of the partnership, the rights which the limited partners are given under
the partnership agreement and the rights which they actually exercise must be
restricted. These rights typically include the following, which normally can be
exercised by a majority in interest of the limited partners: the right to replace the
general partner, in some cases without cause and in some cases only for cause; the
right to amend the partnership agreement; the right to approve the sale of all or
substantially all of the assets of the partnership; and the right to dissolve the
partnership.
The general partner exercises all other management rights, and as such is
responsible for the operation of the partnership's business. Ordinarily the initial
partnership agreement specifies the business the partnership will engage in, and lists
certain limitations on the authority of the general partner.
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Partnership agreement. A limited partnership is created and governed by a
partnership agreement. This partnership agreement specifies all terms which govern
the business of the partnership. Typically a partnership agreement will include
provisions which discuss the following: the business to be undertaken by the
partnership; the types of partners; the capital to be contributed by those partners; how
profits, losses, and cash distributions will be allocated among the partners; the
authority of the general partner, as well as restrictions on the authority of the general
partner'; provisions for the addition or withdrawal of partners; transfers of
partnership interests; and the voting rights of the limited partners.
Two-tier partnerships. Most capital raised in the tax credit industry is raised
by so-called "funds." These funds are generally similar in concept to a mutual fund,
in that an entity is formed to provide a pool of capital to invest in securities issued by
other entities.4 Tax credit funds frequently utilize a "two-tier" partnership structure.
Figure 5-1 illustrates the legal structure of a typical tax credit fund. An investment
a In particular, often these restrictions focus on limiting the authority of the
general partner to permit affiliates of the general partner to transact business
with the partnership (sometimes referred to as "self-dealing"). These are
intended to limit the possibility that a general partner will exploit the limited
partners by entering into contracts and arrangements which benefit the
general partner, but which are not competitive.
* Partnerships which invest in low-income housing can apply for, and will
generally receive, certain exemptions from the Investment Company Act of
1940. Ordinarily an entity which has 100 or more partners (such as most tax
credit funds sold to individual investors), and which invested in the securities
of other issuers in a manner which substantially limits the control of the fund
(such as is the case with the limited partnership interests of the property
partnerships) would be required to comply with the expensive reporting
requirements of the Investment Company Act. The exemption make it possible
to utilize the structure discussed herein, and illustrates another way in which
low-income housing is afforded favorable treatment under Federal law.
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Figure 5-1
Legal Structure of a Typical Tax Credit Fund
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partnership raises the capital from investors. The general partner of the investment
partnership is typically an affiliate of the intermediary or syndicator. This investment
partnership then invests, as a limited partner, in a number of other partnerships.
(There may be as few as two or three property partnerships in a fund,, or as many as
fifty.) Typically each of these other partnerships owns one property. The general
partner of each property partnership is ordinarily an affiliate of the developer of the
respective property.
This structure offers a number of advantages. First, each property is owned
by a separate partnership, which effectively insulates each property from the
liabilities and operating problems of the other properties. Should a property
encounter operating problems, or even face foreclosure, the other properties would be
unaffected. (For this reason, most lenders, including state and Federal agencies,
require that separate partnership be used for each property.) Second, because the
fund is a limited partner of each property partnership, the fund is largely insulated
from the obligations of the properties. As a limited partner, the fund is required to
make its capital contribution but has no further obligation beyond that. Of course,
this protection is also available to the investor limited partners. Third, the two-tier
structure offers efficiency in the process of raising capital. Capital can be raised by
the fund in large amounts and somewhat independently of the process of investing
that capital in properties. A single set of disclosure and offering documents can be
used for the entire fund. A developer need not become involved in or aware of the
process of raising capital. These efficiencies lower time and transaction costs for all
parties. The efficiencies can permit funds to raise capital for properties which would
be too small, relative to the transaction costs, to otherwise allow investor capital to
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be raised. Finally, the two-tier structure with many property investments provides
diversification to the investors. Diversification has proven to be a very powerful
method to create a highly predictable stream of tax benefits for the investors.
Section 5.2 The Actors in the Equity Capital Market
As discussed in Chapter 4, there are three major categories of actors in the
equity capital market: investors, channels, and intermediaries. This section describes
those actors in greater detail. Figure 5-2 illustrates the equity capital market and is
referred to extensively in this section.
In particular, note that Figure 5-2 draws relationships between the actors in
each group of investors, channels, and intermediaries. These relationships indicate
where the majority of transactions between parties are made. As such, they illustrate
important aspects of the structure of the equity capital market. These relationships
are discussed below.
5.2.1 Investors
Investors can be divided into two broad categories, individuals and
corporations. In general terms, investors can be understood by evaluating their
objectives in making the investment and their tolerance for risk.
Individuals. Individual investors ordinarily invest to obtain a higher level of
return than is available from alternative investments.' They are willing to forego
5 For individuals, an investment in a tax credit fund is often compared to a
municipal bond as an alternative investment. Both investments provide a tax-
free or after-tax return. The tax credit is, generally, a steady stream of
benefits for several years, similar to the interest payments on the bond. Of
course, for the tax credit investment, the return of the investor's capital
(continued...)
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Housing Tax Credit Industry - Equity Capital Market
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liquidity to obtain that higher return.' Although they are willing to take on a greater
level of risk than those alternative investments, in general individuals who invest in
tax credit investments are still seeking safety of capital and predictability of return.
These investment objectives help to explain the investments individuals make
and the channels they make them through. Individuals normally invest in tax credit
funds which are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
which are referred to as "public funds." Public funds ordinarily raise substantial
amounts of capital, typically from $20 to $100 million. This provides a diversified
group of properties to the investor, because this large amount of capital is invested in
numerous properties. In addition, because public funds require substantial costs to
create and offer (with SEC and state securities registration being a substantial part
of the cost), and because most securities firms subject the sponsors of the funds to
review prior to selling a public fund, in general public funds are offered by the larger,
more established syndication firms. This can provide a degree of safety to the
investor.
For individuals, public funds can be contrasted with private placements.
Private placements are not registered with the SEC. They are ordinarily offered to
5(...continued)
depends upon the sale of the properties, which would normally be expected to
happen several years after the flow of tax credits ceases.
6 An investment in a tax credit fund is not liquid, in that there is no established
market for the interest and there are significant restrictions on transfers of
partnership interests required in order to maintain the desired tax treatment
of the partnership and obtain the tax benefits. Investors are generally
cautioned not to invest in a tax-credit fund if they require liquidity. However,
there is a limited and somewhat effective secondary market for the interests
available to investors should circumstances such as death, bankruptcy, or
divorce require an investor to sell their interest.
Page 57
a limited number of investors, and as such are exempt from SEC registration. It is
worth noting the interaction of the limitations on the use of the credit, which were
discussed in Chapter 3, with Federal securities law. To obtain the exemption from
registration with the SEC, the number of investors must, as a practical matter, be
limited.' However, at the same time the amount of credit that any individual can use
is strictly limited. The limit on the amount of credit one individual can use effectively
places a limit on the amount one individual can invest. That limit on the amount
invested, combined with the practical implications of the securities laws on the
number of investors in a private placement, means that the amount which can be
raised by using a private placement is limited. Most tax credit private placements for
individuals raise between $1.5 and $3 million. Not surprisingly, a typical private
placement will have fewer property investments than a public fund, and therefore may
provide less diversification. The principal advantage which a private placement offers
to individuals is the ability to make their capital contributions over several years.
(SEC regulations sharply limit the ability of public funds to offer staged capital
contributions.) By paying the capital contributions over several years, investors can
effectively finance part or all of their investment from the stream of benefits flowing
from the investment. In other words, each year for several years the investor is
required to make a capital contribution. However, they are also receiving benefits
from the investment. These tax savings from the investment can be applied to make
" A private placement can have an unlimited number of accredited investors,
who have high incomes and/or high net worth, and up to 35 non-accredited
investors. However, the limitation of 35 non-accredited investors often
becomes the practical limitation because there are far more non-accredited
individuals than accredited individuals.
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some or all of the required capital contribution. This allows investors to purchase the
investment without a large sum of capital.
To date, the activity in the private placement area for individuals has been
quite small relative to the amount of capital raised in other parts of the industry.
However, prior to the 1986 tax act, most of the large tax credit sponsors were active
in private placements. In addition, some sponsors, such as The Arcand Company,
have been able to enter the industry in recent years by starting with private
placements to individuals, then later expanding into products for corporations.
Corporations. Corporations can be grouped into several broad categories, based
upon their objectives for investing and their tolerance for risk. Figure 5-2 shows four
general categories of corporate investor.
Much of the early investment in housing tax credit investments by corporations
was with non-profit sponsors, such as the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC)
and The Enterprise Social Investment Corporation, an affiliate of The Enterprise
Foundation. (These intermediaries are discussed further below.) Corporations began
making these investments shortly after the program began in 1987. The corporations
who invested were primarily interested in obtaining positive public relations and
fulfilling their social responsibilities. Return on capital invested was a distinctly
secondary consideration. These corporate investors were willing to invest without the
expectation that their capital would be returned, and with some expectation that their
return would be unpredictable and smaller than anticipated. In other words, their
tolerance for risk is fairly high. This type of corporate investor is shown in Figure 5-2
in the box marked with the letter C.
Page 59
A second distinct type of corporate investor is shown in Figure 5-2 in the box
marked with the letter D. Throughout most of the life of the tax credit program, there
have been some corporations which have invested more or less directly into properties.
Often these corporations would use the services of individuals who would locate
potential investments for them. These individuals are typically referred to as
"finders." In addition, the corporations also used attorneys to assist them in
negotiating the documents used to make their investments. However, neither finders
nor attorneys typically offer strong skills at understanding and evaluating the
feasibility of a particular property. Furthermore, neither the finder nor the attorney
would typically be involved in the transaction after the corporation had made their
investment. The corporations making these investments felt that they sufficiently
understood the risks, and could deal with any problems that arose. In many cases,
they drew on the talents of their corporate real estate department. In their view, the
costs added by the channels and the intermediaries (typically, brokers and
syndicators) outweighed both the value added from the underwriting and management
skills of the syndicator and the advantages of a diversified portfolio of products.
Investing directly provided them with the highest return, because none of their
investment was used to pay fees to intermediaries.' This type of investor is referred
8 A discussion of how corporations measure return on tax credit investments
could in itself constitute sufficient material for a lengthy article. It is worth
noting that corporate management is primarily measured by the performance
of the stock price of the corporation, which is largely driven by the earnings of
the company. Not surprisingly, then, most investors measure their return on
a tax credit investment by the effect the investment has on the corporation's
earnings. (This is a significantly different calculation than merely calculating
the after-tax internal rate of return based on the flows of tax benefits from the
investment.) As noted in Chapter 3, much of the attraction of the housing tax
(continued...)
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to as a "direct" investor. Two of the earliest direct investors were Chevron and the
Federal National Mortgage Association, or Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae has committed
to invest approximately $400 million in tax credit investments, some through funds
and some directly. Broad, Inc. (later SunAmerica), Pacificorp, and Southern California
Edison have also invested substantial sums in this manner. Recently, Transamerica
Insurance and NationsBank have announced their intention to make substantial
direct investments in housing tax credit properties.
The next type of corporate investor which became active can be categorized as
primarily seeking return while, at the same time, the corporations were concerned
that the level of risk which they were taking not be excessive. The individuals
making the investments on behalf of the corporations needed to have a sufficient level
of comfort that the returns would, in fact, be generated and that the investment would
prove to be a reasonably good one for the corporation. Of course, the individuals
recommending the investment were also concerned that they not put their own career
at risk by having the corporation make an investment which later proved to be a poor
investment. These corporations had only a moderate tolerance for risk. Relatively
8
...continued)
credit for corporate investors stems from a specific feature of the tax law. In
particular, because the credits do not reduce an investor's tax basis, and
therefore create no deferred tax liability, they generate the maximum impact
on a corporate investor's earnings. In addition, many corporations also invest
because reducing their tax liability reduces the corporation's effective tax rate.
The effective tax rate is roughly equal to the amount of tax paid divided by the
amount of net income for the corporation. Effective tax rate, like earnings, is
a measure used to evaluate the effectiveness of a firm's management. Firm
executives are therefore motivated to invest in order to reduce their taxes, so
that their corporations will be judged to have performed better. For the
purposes of this discussion, these considerations are all broadly considered
aspects of the economic return to the corporation.
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few corporations invested initially, and those that did invest limited their investments
to diversified portfolios of properties sponsored by syndication firms with some track
record in the industry or with other product features, such as operating subsidies,
which provided a measure of safety. As a result of the dual objectives of return and
safety, corporate investors of this type largely limited their investments to for-profit
sponsors who invested in properties developed by for-profit developers. The
corporations viewed those properties as more likely to be feasible over the fifteen year
compliance period, as well as more likely to be sold for an amount which could return
their capital when the compliance period was over. This type of corporate investor is
shown in Figure 5-2 in the box marked with the letter B. This type of corporation
began making small investments in 1989, but became most noticeably active in 1990
when The Boston Financial Group organized the first successful large-scale fund for
corporate investors. This fund raised approximately $25 million in 1990 and had
raised a total of $51 million when closed in 1991. This was far more than the
sponsors or industry observers expected, and marked the beginning of the influx of
corporate dollars into housing tax credits.
The fourth and final major type of investor emerged in 1990 and 1991, shortly
after Boston Financial's initial success with a large corporate fund. Broad, Inc. had
invested directly in a number of properties in the late 1980s. However, Broad found
it could not utilize the tax benefits because the corporation was subject to the
alternative minimum tax.' Broad offered other corporations the opportunity to invest
9 The alternative minimum tax (AMT) is an alternative tax calculation intended
to ensure that every taxpayer is required to pay some tax. The housing tax
credit cannot be used to reduce AMT liability, although unused tax credits can
be carried forward or back to other years with tax liability.
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in the tax credit producing properties. Most notably, however, they provided certain
guarantees to these corporate investors. Broad guaranteed to fund all operating
deficits of the properties, and agreed to provided a form of minimum return guarantee.
For example, until 1993 most of the investments Broad offered were priced to deliver
the investors approximately a 15% internal rate of return. Broad agreed to make
payments to the investors if the returns fell below 10%, in an amount sufficient to
provide a return of at least 10%. Recent developments are discussed further below
in Section 5.3. By early 1994, investors were willing to accept an 8 to 9% return on
their investment in products which were guaranteed in this fashion. Clearly this type
of investor was willing to accept a lower return in exchange for the safety of the
guarantees. This type of investor is shown in Figure 5-2 in the box marked with the
letter A.
5.2.2 Intermediaries
Figure 5-2 also lists several types of intermediaries who operate in the housing
tax credit industry. As the lines on Figure 5-2 indicate, each investor type has
historically shown strong tendencies to transact their business with certain types of
intermediaries. The types of intermediaries, and the types of investors who ordinarily
invest through those intermediaries, are discussed below. Intermediaries are
distinguished, in part, based upon whether they invest in properties across the nation
or in a region; as well as upon whether they invest substantially all of the funds
raised into properties which benefit from subsidies or whether they invest primarily
in properties which do not receive subsidies, other than the tax credit.
Corporate Guarantors. This type of intermediary acquires the properties with
its own capital. At a later date, typically when the properties have completed
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construction and are generating tax credits, these firms offer corporate investors the
opportunity to invest in the properties. To induce these corporate investors to accept
a lower return, they offer certain guarantees, as discussed above. There are currently
two firms operating as corporate guarantors: SunAmerica, an insurance and financial
services company formerly known as Broad, and Mission First Financial, a subsidiary
of Southern California Edison.
Not surprisingly, this type of intermediary corresponds closely with a particular
type of investor. This investor is seeking safety and return. Corporate guarantors
currently raise all of their funds from corporate investors. This eliminates the need
for costly and time-consuming securities regulations associated with selling to
individuals, as well as the high costs of brokers to distribute the investment to
individuals.
Unlike the other intermediaries, the corporate guarantors initially acquire the
properties with their own capital and later resell them to the investors. Obviously
this requires large amounts of capital, and exposes that capital to risk. Their profit
is the difference between the price they paid for the properties and the price at which
they sell the properties to the investors.
For-Profit Syndicators. For-profit syndicators currently have the largest share
of the market. Most for-profit syndicators invest in properties throughout the country,
although many tend to concentrate in certain regions. Certain for-profit syndicators,
such as The Richman Group and The Arcand Company, have historically invested
almost exclusively in properties which have operating or financing subsidies, in
addition to the subsidy provided by the tax credit. Some of the other for-profit
syndicators invest substantially in properties which receive only the tax credit
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subsidy. Examples of this latter type of syndicator include The Boston Financial
Group and National Partnership Investments Corporation (NAPICO). Finally, some
syndication firms invest significant amounts in both types of properties. Boston
Capital and Related Capital are examples of this type of sponsor.
Both corporations and individuals invest with for-profit syndicators. These
corporations and individuals are investing primarily for return, and do not seek the
safety of a guaranteed product. At the same time, they seek a level of safety by
investing with sponsors who have experience selecting and managing properties, and
who will assemble a diversified pool of properties for the investors.
For-profit syndicators ordinarily raise the investor capital prior to or
concurrently with acquiring the properties. They generally do not use large amounts
of their own capital to acquire properties, and ordinarily do not risk their capital for
significant periods of time. The fees received by the syndicators are typically a fixed
percentage of the capital, which is disclosed to the investors.
Non-profit syndicators. Non-profit syndicators are organizations which are
themselves typically a non-profit entity. Furthermore, they typically invest in
properties which are developed by non-profit developers. The primary examples of
non-profit syndicators are LISC and Enterprise, which were mentioned above. In
addition, affiliates of these two groups as well as non-affiliated entities also sponsor
a variety of funds which focus their property investments upon a specific state or
region. Typically the properties in which these intermediaries invest have substantial
operating and financing subsidies.
For the most part, the corporations which invest with non-profit syndicators
are a distinct group from the other investors. They are not principally motivated by
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economic considerations, while all of the other types of investors are motivated
primarily to seek a level of return and risk at which they are comfortable.
Non-profit syndicators are similar to for-profit syndicators in that they do not
typically risk their own capital. In addition, fees and costs are generally fixed
amounts.
Finally, note that corporations who invest directly into property partnerships
do not use the services of intermediaries. Direct corporate investors are illustrated
in Figure 5-2.
5.2.3 Channels
Intermediaries are brought together with investors through a variety of
channels. Intermediaries who are seeking individual investors ordinarily use
established broker/dealer firms who market a variety of investment products to
individuals. These firms may include the recognized Wall Street firms (Dean Witter,
Merrill Lynch, Smith Barney Shearson, and so on), as well as smaller national and
regional firms, and financial planning organizations (such as IDS or Royal American).
These firms are viewed as providing the only method of reaching the large number of
individual investors necessary to raise substantial amounts of capital. However, the
fees paid to the brokers for their services are typically high - 6 to 8% of the capital
raised.
For-profit sponsors who are marketing to corporations also use, to a limited
degree, regional and national broker-dealers. However, most of the capital is raised
through brokers who specialize in marketing this investment to corporations. For
most of these firms, their only activity is marketing tax credit products to
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corporations. Recently, at least one sponsor (Boston Financial) has stopped using
brokers to market to corporations.
The corporate guarantor intermediaries have either marketed the product on
their own or, in the case of SunAmerica, with the services of a national bank, First
Chicago. First Chicago has historically had a small group which marketed tax-
oriented investments to corporations.
Section 5.3 Market Trends in the Equity Capital Market
The equity capital market has changed and evolved a great deal since the
LIHC program became effective in 1987. Figure 5-3 graphs the annual amount of
capital raised each year in the housing tax credit industry, showing the portion raised
from individuals and the portion raised from corporations." Initially, relatively little
capital was raised. Few investors, intermediaries, and developers were familiar with
the program. Much of the tax credit available went unused. By 1988, however,
individual investors had become aware of the tax credit and capital invested by
individuals rose sharply. In 1988 and 1989, tax credits were a "hot product" for the
Wall Street and regional brokers. Approximately $590 million was raised from
individuals in 1989. At the same time, there was some investment by corporations,
10 The figures for capital raised are based on a number of sources, including
Boston Capital; Boston Financial; Local Initiatives Support Corporation Annual
Report for 1992; The Stanger Report; and other sources. However, no
definitive sources exist for much of the capital raised in the industry, since
much of the capital is raised privately and is not subject to public reporting.
Many of the numbers are approximate and/or estimated. Also, note that
corporations often make their payments of capital over time. The amounts of
capital raised for corporate investors have been adjusted to approximate a
discounted, cash equivalent amount of capital, so that all figures will be
roughly comparable.
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Figure 5-3
Annual Capital Raised
From Corporations and Individuals
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but it remained a small share of the market. Corporations invested approximately
$240 million in 1989. Most of the capital invested by corporations in these years was
either direct investment by a small number of corporations or capital invested with
non-profit syndicators.
In 1990 and 1991, the amount of capital raised from individuals declined
significantly, to $310 million in 1991, a level well below the 1988 highs. The decline
in sales is not well understood. It has been attributed to a number of factors,
including saturation of the market as those investors who were willing to invest in
credits obtained all the credit they were allowed to use under the tax law; as well as
frequent negative publicity about the problems with real estate partnerships which
had been formed in the 1980s.
As investments by individuals declined in 1990 and 1991, however, capital
raised from corporations increased. This was not coincidence, in that sponsors
intentionally sought to replace the decline in investments by individuals with capital
raised from corporations. Capital raised from corporations rose sharply in 1992, to
about $670 million, and again in 1993, to about $1.41 billion, more than doubling the
amount of capital raised in the entire industry. In 1993 total capital raised was
approaching $2 billion. This dramatic increase in the amount of capital raised from
corporations has had a number of effects on the industry, as will be illustrated below
and discussed in Chapter 8.
Figure 5-4 again illustrates the annual capital raised, in this instance showing
the relative share of non-profit firms and for-profit firms. (The for-profit amounts
include amounts invested directly by corporations without the use of intermediaries.)
The amount of capital raised by non-profits has grown steadily but slowly during the
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Figure 5-4
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life of the tax credit program. An estimated $510 million was raised by non-profit
intermediaries in 1993. However, the amount of funds raised by for-profits has
increased sharply from 1991 to 1993, and represents most of the growth in the
industry. For profit intermediaries raised an estimated $1.39 billion in 1993, of the
total capital raised of $1.9 billion.
The capital raised by for-profit entities is graphed in Figure 5-5. Of course, it
again illustrates the sharp rise in the amount of capital raised. In addition, it shows
the growth in the number of significant intermediaries. Boston Capital, Boston
Financial, and Related show regular, if varying, amounts of investment from 1988
through 1993. In 1988, those three firms held a sizeable share of the market. By
1993, seven firms had raised a significant level of capital. Figure 5-6 shows the share
of the annual capital raised for each of the seven largest sponsors. This again
illustrates the proliferation of sponsors.
If we focus solely on the capital raised each year from corporations, the point
is illustrated more dramatically. Figure 5-7 shows the steep rise in sales, as well as
the fragmentation of the market among numerous syndication firms as well as direct
investors. Figure 5-8 shows the share of the capital raised from corporations by
various for-profit sponsors. Most notable in this chart is the very high share
represented by direct investment by corporations, in many years. Because the amount
of capital invested directly by corporations did not rise as quickly as total investment,
the share of the market taken by direct investment has fallen. However, it still
represents a significant share.
The dramatic increase in the funds raised from corporations has had a
tremendous impact on the equity capital market, as might have been expected. Figure
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Figure 5-5
Annual Capital Raised by For-Profit Entities
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Annual Capital Raised by For-Profit Entities from Corporations
1200
1000
= 800
E
600
400
200
0
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Page 74
Arcand
L Boston Capital
* Boston Financial
NAPICO
Related
Richman
Sun America
Direct
Other For-Profit
...........
Figure 5-8
Annual Capital Raised by For-Profit Entities
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
from Corporations
1992 1993
Page 75
100% -
90% -
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30% -
20%
10%
0% -
* Arcand
El Boston Capital
Boston Financial
lil1 NAPICO
E Related
M Richman
M Sun America
E Direct
1111 Other For-Profit
5-9 charts two sets of data: the amount of capital raised from corporations, and the
price paid to developers for tax credit properties." The credit price paid to
developers is expressed in the industry as the number of cents of equity capital
provided for each dollar of tax credit generated. For example, if a property is expected
to generate $200,000 of tax credit each year for ten years, it will generate a total of
$2,000,000 of tax credit. If the market price for that tax credit property is 50 cents,
the equity capital received by the property partnership is then $1,000,000. From late
1992 to early 1994, prices paid to developers increased by over 17%. This increase in
prices corresponds to the increase in capital investment by corporations. In other
words, the influx of corporate capital sharply increased the prices paid to developers
for tax credits.
Of course, the amount paid for tax credits cannot rise without yields falling.
Figure 5-10 shows that yields, as measured by the internal rate of return on the
stream on tax benefits, fell sharply over the period from 1992 to 1994, as the amount
of capital invested rose. In 1992, corporate investors in tax credit partnerships were
" The developer's profit is typically equal to the difference between (a) the total
capitalization of the property partnership, that is, the debt plus the equity
capital, minus (b) the costs of developing the property. Therefore, in the short
term increasing prices paid for tax credits increase developer profits. However,
see Chapter 8 for a discussion of how, in the longer-term, this is not true.
Also, note that although the credit price paid to developers, as well as the
yields and fees discussed below, are based upon an analysis of the corporate
tax credit programs of a single sponsor, The Boston Financial Group. This
data should be representative of the industry. Boston Financial is a significant
player in a competitive market, so their pricing should provide reasonably
accurate data. Further, the data has the advantages of consistency and
accuracy; it is not possible to obtain consistent and accurate data for the
market as a whole.
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Figure 5-9
As Corporations Invested More Capital, Prices to Developers Rose
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Figure 5-10
As Corporations Invested More Capital, Yields and Fees Fell
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enjoying yields over 17%; by 1994, effective yields had fallen to 12%." This reflects
the effects of increasing amounts of capital competing for a fixed amount of tax credits
available for investment.
While the developers who control the supply of tax credit properties have
clearly had the most leverage in the market, the large corporate investors who supply
the capital are, of course, not without influence. At the same time that developers
were seeking the highest prices for the tax credits their projects were generating,
investors were trying to obtain the highest investment yields possible. Figure 5-10
shows one way in which that was accomplished: reducing the spread between the
amount invested by the corporation and the amount paid to the developer by reducing
fees and expenses. These reductions principally represent reductions to the offering
expenses, and the selling commissions paid to brokers. So the sharp rise in capital
invested by corporations has, in the past two years, resulted in dramatic changes to
the economics of the investment for developers, investors, and brokers. These changes
will be discussed further in Chapter 8.
2 The yield received by the investor depends upon whether they receive their
capital back after the 15 year compliance period. Typically a number of
scenarios are evaluated for distributions to the investors upon the sale of the
property. For simplicity, the yield figures herein are based on an average of
two yield numbers, the first assuming that no cash is distributed to the
investors upon sale and the second assuming a cash distribution sufficient to
return all investors their capital investment.
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Chapter 6
The Property Market
In explaining the equity capital market, we have of necessity already touched on the
key players in the property market: intermediaries and developers. Intermediaries
turn to the property market to invest the funds which they have raised from investors.
They negotiate with developers for the price and terms upon which an investment will
be made in a property. In the current market environment, intermediaries compete
with one another for the right to invest in tax credit properties. This section will
further discuss the actors in the property market.
Section 6.1 Developers
The property market is diagrammed in Figure 6-1. Six types of developers are
set forth. These six types of developers have been developed based upon the defining
characteristics which tend to lead various developers to work with certain types of
intermediaries. The three variables are the size of the developer; whether the
development organization is for-profit or non-profit; and whether the properties they
develop receive financing and/or operating subsidies.
For-profit developers might focus on properties which benefit only from the
subsidy provided by the tax credit, or on properties which benefit from substantial
operating or financing subsidies. The principal examples of properties which receive
additional subsidies include the following: Farmers Home Administration properties,
which receive mortgages for 97% of the cost of the property at an effective rate of 1%
and, in many cases, operating subsidies as well; and properties with a wide variety
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of subsidies provided by state or local governments, which may include grants or
below market mortgages.
The level of subsidy received by a property can be thought of as a point on a
continuum: those properties with no subsidy other than the tax credit are on one end
of the continuum, and properties with substantial financing and operating subsidies,
such as Farmers Home properties, are on the other end of the continuum. There are
properties at almost every point on the scale in between. For example, many state
and local governments have programs to provide a so-called "soft second" mortgage for
a property. Under these programs, a property obtains a conventional first mortgage.
The state or local government provides a second mortgage with debt service payable
at a below-market rate, and in some cases payable only if and when the property
generates sufficient cash flow to pay the debt service on the second mortgage.
However, the degree of subsidy depends upon the fraction of the total cost of the
project which is financed using the soft second mortgage; how far below market the
interest rate is; and how soft the soft second mortgage is, that is, whether payments
of debt service are deferred if the property cannot pay them currently. It is in this
sense, then, that there is a continuum of subsidy.
If there is no clear line determining the amount of subsidy a property benefits
from then, of course, there is no clear line dividing the types of developers. However,
the distinctions set forth in Figure 6-1 do provide a useful model for understanding
developers in the context of the property market.
Note that Figure 6-1 does not include large non-profit developers as a type of
developer. In general, non-profits tend not to do a substantial number of large
properties on a regular basis.
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Finally, it is worth noting that the development of housing tax credit
properties, like all housing development, is a localized business. There are many
development firms operating in the property market. Relatively few have a large
organization or develop properties in more than one or two states. Few developers
have a market share in excess of 1% of the national market.
Section 6.2 Intermediaries
Five types of intermediaries are set forth in Figure 6-1: corporate guarantors;
for-profit syndicators; for-profit syndicators which focus on subsidized properties; non-
profit national syndicators; and regionally-oriented non-profit sponsors. In addition,
corporations which invest directly are included in the diagram because they
participate in the property market and therefore can influence all of the other actors.
The five types of intermediaries were described in Chapter 5. Of particular
interest, then, in describing the property market is understanding the typical
relationships between developers and intermediaries.1
Corporations which invest directly tend to focus on the largest properties or on
the developers who generate the largest amounts of tax credits from a series of
properties. Presumably this minimizes the transaction costs involved in identifying
properties for investment, as well as in evaluating the feasibility of those properties
and in closing a transaction.
1 Of course, the intermediaries and their investors share similar investment
preferences, either because the investors have specified their preferences to the
intermediary before investing their capital or, as may be the case for the non-profit
intermediaries, the intermediary has sought out investors whose preferences reflect
the intermediary's agenda.
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Of course, for these same reasons the largest developers are also very attractive
to corporate guarantors and for-profit syndicators. However, because these latter two
types of intermediaries are more specialized, they are also able to actively pursue
medium-sized properties and developers in a cost-effective manner.
Small for-profit developers generally do not have access to capital through
intermediaries. The transaction costs are too large, relative to the amount of capital
invested, for the intermediaries. In particular, the time needed to evaluate the
abilities of the developer and the feasibility of the property for a small investment
lead most intermediaries to avoid investing in small properties with for-profit
developers. As a result, many of these properties are either syndicated, often locally,
to a single corporation or a small group of individuals; or the developer retains the tax
credits for its own use.
For-profit syndicators are also interested in medium to large developers where
the properties benefit from subsidies. Again, for small developers and small
properties the transaction costs are high enough to preclude investment by some for-
profit syndicators.
Certain intermediaries have primarily focussed on small- to medium-sized for-
profit developers, where subsidies are significant. For example, a number of
intermediaries have historically focused on acquiring properties which benefit from
Farmers Home subsidies. Examples include Arcand, Sterling and to a lesser degree
Boston Capital. These properties are typically developed by fairly small development
organizations. At least one intermediary, The Richman Group, has historically
focused on subsidized properties of all sizes, including properties developed by both
for-profit sponsors and non-profit sponsors.
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Medium and small non-profit developers generally raise capital through
national or regional non-profit syndicators. Although most for-profit syndicators have
historically invested in some larger subsidized properties with the medium-sized
developers, this has not been a consistent source of capital for non-profit developers.
Section 6.3 Typical Agreements Between Intermediaries and Developers
Intermediaries invest capital in a property partnership only after both parties
have executed a set of agreements to govern the business relationship over the life of
the investment. As discussed in Chapter 4, the principal document is a partnership
agreement. The intermediary always invests as a limited partner, with strictly
limited rights under the agreement. This provides the intermediary with protection
from the liabilities of the property partnership.
In order to align the incentives of the developer with those of the intermediary
and the equity capital investors, developers ordinarily agree to a set of guarantees and
obligations regarding the development and operation of the property. To some degree,
the types of guarantees are similar for various intermediaries, for three reasons.
First, the early industry participants developed typical practices and standards which
were widely imitated by later entrants. Second, a common set of legal and accounting
experts provide advice to many of the intermediaries, which has tended to standardize
their practices. Third, investors value certain provisions of the guarantees and
therefore require intermediaries to agree, before the investor invests its capital, to
include those provisions for all property investments. In general, these provisions are
as follows.
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Construction completion. The developer2 is obligated to fund all costs
necessary to complete the property. In some cases, a payment and performance bond
is required to guarantee construction completion.
Operating deficit obligation. Should property expenses exceed rental income,
the developer is typically obligated to fund operating deficits for a period of time
following the completion of the property. This obligation may run for a fixed period
of time, or until a particular operating benchmark is reached, or some combination of
those terms. Similarly, the amount of deficits may be limited to a specific amount or
may be unlimited. For example, a typical for-profit intermediary might require the
developer to fund all operating deficits, without limit, until the property generates
enough income from operations to pay all operating expenses. (This is referred to as
"breakeven.") For three to four years thereafter, the developer may be obligated to
fund operating deficits up to some specified maximum amount. Some intermediaries
require the developer to agree to fund some amount of operating deficits for the full
fifteen year compliance period for the property.
Credit adjusters. Should the tax credits generated by the property be less than
anticipated, typically the capital payable by the intermediary to the property
partnership will be reduced. (If the capital has already been paid, the developer will
be obligated to repay the appropriate amount.) These "adjuster provisions" are
2 For the purposes of this discussion, to maintain consistency it is assumed that the
developer is required to undertake the various obligations. In many cases, these
obligations are in fact undertaken by the general partner of the property partnership.
While this is important for legal and tax purposes, it is not necessary to make this
distinction in order to understand the business terms. Therefore, because the
property general partner is typically an affiliate of the developer, the distinction is
ignored for the purposes of this discussion.
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intended to generally maintain the tax credit return relative to the amount of capital
invested in the property.
Purchase obligation. Frequently the developer will be obligated to buy the
limited partner interest and repay the full amount of the capital invested to the
intermediary should the property fail to achieve completion, permanent mortgage
financing, or delivery of substantial amounts of tax credits. These purchase
obligations appear to have a low level of enforceability, in that they are seldom if ever
enforced in practice because the developers in such circumstances are typically unable
or unwilling to fulfill this obligation. However, they do provide an incentive for the
developer to perform its obligations.
Representations and warranties. Typically developers are obligated to make
certain representations to the intermediary. For example, a developer may be
required to represent that the property is owned by the partnership, that the property
has obtained a reservation of tax credits, and so on. In addition, a developer is
typically required to warrant that they will take certain actions, such as renting the
property only to tenants who comply with the guidelines for the tax credit program.
This provides the investing intermediary with a legal right to sue for damages or
obtain specific performance, should the developer fail to make truthful representations
or comply with the warranties.
Conditional capital contributions. Normally the capital contributions payable
to the property partnership are payable only when certain conditions have been met.
For example, the initial installment may be payable when construction commences,
the construction loan closes, and a permanent financing commitment has been
obtained. The second installment would typically be paid upon completion of the
Page 86
construction of the property. The third installment would be paid when the
permanent loan closing occurs, and when the property partnership's accountants have
determined the estimated amount of the annual tax credit. A fourth installment
would typically be paid when the property achieves breakeven operations. Depending
on the perceived risk of the property and the standards of the intermediary, there may
be additional installments of capital which are conditioned upon the performance of
the property. For example, capital may be held until the property achieves a debt
service coverage ratio of 1.10 or 1.15. (The debt service coverage ratio is equal to the
net operating income of the property, after deducting operating expenses, divided by
the required payments of debt service.)
Many industry participants hold the view that the most important protection
for the intermediary and the investor, after careful selection of properties and
developers, is the conditions on the capital contributions. Should a property
experience problems, often the developer will be unable to fulfill their obligations. The
capital which is still being withheld provides the intermediary with critical financial
resources to work toward a resolution of the problems.
Of course, the standard set of obligations is often varied depending upon the
specific nature of the investment to be made. Most often, the two most important
variables are the financial strength of the development organization and the level of
subsidy on the property. For example, with a financially strong development group,
an intermediary may be more willing to rely upon the guarantees of the developer to
protect against potential risks in the investment. On the other hand, with a less
strong developer the intermediary might not value the guarantees of the developer,
and may instead require bonding from third parties or escrows of capital to ensure
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that property risks are protected against. Similarly, a property with substantial
subsidy and very low rents may be viewed as having little risk due to market
fluctuations.' Certain of the protections required of a property without subsidy may
be eased or waived on a property which benefits from substantial subsidy.
Section 6.4 Relationships and Competition in the Property Market
The set of relationships between intermediaries and developers shown in
Figure 6-1 and discussed above provides a guide to the level of competition among
intermediaries for access to certain property types. At the simplest level, except for
small for-profit developers, there are multiple intermediaries willing to compete for
investments from every developer and for every property type. This, in itself, implies
a certain level of rivalry for property investments.
Of course, the market is more complex than that. Figure 6-1 merely illustrates
how many different types of intermediaries compete for investments generated by the
various types of developers. For a more accurate understanding, one must consider
how many alternative intermediaries are available to each developer type, and how
much capital is being raised by those intermediaries. In the for-profit area, in recent
a Although many industry participants often assume that properties with substantial
subsidy are less risky, it is more accurate to view them as having different risks than
properties which do not benefit from subsidies. Properties with substantial subsidy
are often highly regulated, which brings regulatory risk. For example, in recent years
properties subject to regulation by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development have experienced delays of several years in processing approvals.
Furthermore, while subsidies may in some cases reduce the exposure of a property to
competition for tenants, that only reduces the risks on the income side of the equation.
There are also risks on the expense side. Many highly subsidized properties are
experiencing unanticipated operating expenses and, as a result, are struggling to
remain viable.
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years for-profit syndicators have raised the largest amounts of capital, as was
illustrated by the discussion in Chapter 5. Corporate guarantors and direct investors
have also raised and invested substantial amounts. So there are several alternative
types of intermediaries raising substantial capital. Furthermore, there are several
such firms within each type of intermediary participating in the property market.
This provides the developer with a variety of sources for capital. Not surprisingly,
then, there is intense rivalry in the current market for properties developed by for-
profit developers.
There are two principal areas in which the competition among intermediaries
for the right to transact with developers manifests itself: price and terms. The results
of the competition on price were illustrated in Figure 5-9. Competition on terms
principally manifests itself in the negotiation of the guarantees and other obligations
discussed in Section 6.3, as well as on a number of other obligations contained in the
agreements between the parties. A developer will generally seek to minimize its
obligations. It is very difficult to measure, in a meaningful and accurate way, the
extent of the competition on terms. Obviously, these are private transactions and data
is available for only a fraction of the actual investments made. However, although
comprehensive data is not available, it is indisputably clear from discussions with
industry participants that extensive competition on terms has taken place.
Of course, in many respects it is as difficult for investors to ascertain the extent
of competition on terms as it is for industry observers. By their nature,
intermediaries act as agents for the investors, and are responsible for utilizing their
own judgement in negotiations with developers. For the most part, corporate
investors have not imposed extensive or detailed requirements upon intermediaries.
Page 89
To the extent that significant amounts of capital are raised by intermediaries from
investors who are either not concerned with terms or who are not monitoring the
terms of the investment, it creates significant pressures to compete on terms in the
market.
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Chapter 7
An Analysis of the Housing Tax Credit Industry
Chapters 4 through 6 provided a description of the housing tax credit industry.
With that background, we can now analyze the industry. This analysis primarily
focusses on the equity capital market, rather than the property market. However,
some background on and discussion of the property market is necessary to understand
the equity capital market. Furthermore, this analysis emphasizes the role of
corporations as investors, and does not examine in depth the role of the individual
investor. This analysis looks principally at two areas: the industry environment in
which the firms operate, and some general characteristics of the firms which operate
in the industry. Through segmentation and strategic mapping, a clearer and more
coherent picture of the industry is developed.
This discussion is intended to describe and discuss the structure of the
industry, rather than to develop or evaluate possible strategies which firms might
follow. Therefore, much of the analysis contained in the classic works on competitive
analysis, such as Porter's Competitive Strategy and Competitive Advantage, is beyond
the scope of this discussion.' In particular, the discussion herein intentionally omits,
for the most part, Porter's well-known analyses of industry attractiveness, which is
intended to help a firm decide whether to enter or exit an industry, and competitive
position, which is intended to help a firm develop a position in the industry which
1 Those works are Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing
Industries and Competitors, New York, The Free Press, 1980, and Competitive
Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, New York, The Free Press,
1985.
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provides competitive advantage. Rather, the type of discussion in this work might
serve as the initial basis for a firm wishing to go on to develop strategies. A firm
doing strategic planning would want to take a detailed look at all of the firms in an
industry, as well as thoroughly analyzing the firm's own competitive assets and
liabilities. However, the fundamental aspects of Porter's works do provide an
approach to understanding the housing tax credit industry which has relevance,
particularly to the extent that they provide a clearer view by highlighting certain
general patterns and they help to explain the behavior of firms within the industry.
Section 7.1 Segmentation
According to Porter, "An industry is a market in which similar or closely
related products are sold to buyers."2 Figure 7-1 summarizes the key buyer and
product dimensions which characterize the equity capital market in the housing tax
credit industry. These fit well within Porter's definition - there are distinct buyer and
product varieties, but as a group they are all closely related and are distinct from
other markets. As such, they form an industry.
Industry segmentation requires an understanding of buyer needs and of
product varieties. There are four broad categories which Porter suggests for variables
to use in segmenting an industry: product, buyer type, channel, and geography. To
the extent that one variable is closely correlated to another and is therefore a good
proxy for that other variable, these can be combined. The labels along the edges of
Figure 7-1 indicate the variables; closely correlated variables exist along both the
2 Porter 1985, p. 233. The discussion of industry segmentation follows Porter, pp. 231-
263.
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Figure 7-1
Segmentation Matrix for the Housing Tax Credit Equity Capital Industry
Buyer Type
A. Individual
Intermediary
B. Corporation
Intermediary
C. Corporation
Direct
Product Features
Intermediary For-Profit Non-Profit None
Return Guarantees Guaranteed | Not Guaranteed | Varies Not Guaranteed
Subsidy Moderate Subsidy I Substantial Subsidy Varying Subsidy
Geography National State Varying
Buyer Objectives
Yield Low Medium Medium Medium Varies High
Social Responsibility Low Low Low High High Varies
Safety through: Financial Guarantee Sponsor Selection Subsidies Subsidies Varies Higher Risk
Notes:
1. Null cells represent segments for which there cannot be any firms operating or, in the case of Cell A5, where it is unlikely that any firms will
ever operate (rather than segments In which there are currently no firms operating).
2. Moderate subsidy means tax credits; or, for some properties, tax credits combined with modest financing subsidy.
3. Substantial subsidy means tax credits combined with substantial financing or operating subsidy.
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buyer variables and the product variables. The relationships between these variables
were discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. In particular, the relationships in place between
certain industry participants and the objectives of the buyers define the segmentation
matrix.
Note the null cells in Figure 7-1. Porter cautions that it is important to
identify as null cells only those segments which represent infeasible combinations of
the segmentation variables, not merely cells where there are currently no firms
operating. In fact, identifying feasible combinations where there is currently no firm
active - that is, potential products and buyers - represent potential opportunities for
a firm.
Having established the industry segments in Figure 7-1, Figure 7-2 provides
a simplified version of the matrix, but with the names of firms operating in each
segment listed in the appropriate cell. "Firms provide the link between products and
buyers."a
Obviously, some segments of the industry are crowded. This is particularly
true of the for-profit intermediary, non-guaranteed, moderate subsidy segments which
serve individuals and corporations. The for-profit intermediary, non-guaranteed,
substantial subsidy segments have several firms operating in them as well. There is
limited activity in the guaranteed segments, presumably because few firms currently
have the capability to offer the guarantees. It is interesting to note the empty cells.
Certain products are not being offered by firms to individuals: guaranteed products,
and a non-profit intermediary product.
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a Porter 1985, p. 233.
Figure 7-2
Segmentation Matrix for the Housing Tax Credit Equity Capital Industry
Buyer Type
A. Individual
Intermediary
B. Corporation
Intermediary
C. Corporation
Direct
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Product Features
Intermediary For-Profit Non-Profit None
Return Guarantees Guaranteed | Not Guaranteed I Varies Not Guaranteed
Subsidy Moderate Subsidy I Substantial Subsidy Varying Subsidy
Geography National | State Varying
Porter notes that segments of an industry have a structure just as industries
do, and many of the approaches to analyzing an industry can be applied to a
segment.4 For example, just as barriers to entry to an industry are a critical factor,
barriers to entry to a segment determine behavior of firms within a segment. A
related concept is the mobility of firms among segments. Figure 7-2 would be useful
in evaluating the implications of firms already in the industry entering new segments.
Section 7.2 Understanding the Competitive Environment
7.2.1 Industry Life Cycle
Most industries show certain similar trends over time, a concept referred to as
the industry life cycle.'
The industry begins when a new product is introduced by a firm.
Typically, the initial production capacity of the innovator is below what
the market will support. Growth and profit opportunities in the new
industry appear to be very attractive, and new entry occurs.6
Initially, then, for a successful product sales rise and so do the number of competitors
in the industry. Often, in fact, too many competitors enter the industry, and there is
more production capacity than an industry can support. Then the industry enters a
shake-out or consolidation phase. The firms which can best meet the customers'
needs, in terms of price and product performance, will survive the shake-out. Once
the number of competitors and the industry capacity declines, the industry may enter
4 Porter 1985, p. 231.
5 Sharon M. Oster, Modern Competitive Analysis, New York, Oxford University Press,
1990, p. 8. The analytical approach underlying this chapter relies heavily upon Oster
and Porter, 1985.
6 Oster, p. 9.
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a period of stability. The character of the industry, and therefore the types of
opportunities which are available to industry participants, change over time.
As should become more apparent in Chapter 8, the housing tax credit industry
fits this description of the industry life cycle quite well, particularly if the focus is
placed on corporate investors. For example, in late 1992 the demand for investment
product by corporations began to exceed the industry's capacity to supply investments.
Profit opportunities were high. Numerous firms entered the industry. Currently, it
appears that the capacity of the industry to intermediate tax credit investments
exceeds that necessary, given the limited amount of tax credits which are available.
The tax credit industry appears to be entering the shake-out stage.
At the same time, there is also a product life-cycle at work. Over time,
innovations and the development of substitute products can be expected to produce
competitive products which better meet the needs of some or all of the industry's
customers. Therefore, in the absence of growth in the underlying market of
customers, sales of a product can be expected to decline over time.
7.2.2 Competitive Forces
Porter outlines five competitive forces which determine industry profitability
by influencing the prices, costs, and required investments of firms in an industry.
These forces are the threat of new entrants; the bargaining power of buyers; the
threat of substitute products or services; the bargaining power of suppliers; and the
rivalry among existing firms. "The strength of each of the five competitive forces is
a function of industry structure, or the underlying economic and technical
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characteristics of an industry."7 The discussion in this chapter focusses on a
discussion of the elements of industry structure. However, a limited discussion of the
effect of the structure of the tax credit industry on the five competitive forces will be
useful.
The threat of new entrants and rivalry are discussed in greater detail below.
To turn to the other three forces, within the equity capital market, clearly the
bargaining power of buyers is significant. Corporations are a concentrated source of
demand. With $10 to $100 million they wish to invest, they can exercise significant
leverage over intermediaries. At the same time, though, intermediaries have shown
an ability to extract high profits due to their access to a supply of tax credit
properties. Thus, while buyers have an upper hand, the advantage is not
overwhelming.
Looking at the threat of substitutes yields some surprising results.
Corporations, who presumably have a wide range of investment opportunities, in fact
have few substitutes for tax credit investments. No other investment product has the
favorable impacts of increasing earnings and reducing the corporation's effective tax
rate. To individuals, on the other hand, an after-tax return is an after-tax return.
There are many competing investments, many of which serve as adequate substitutes
for tax credit investments.
As to the bargaining power of suppliers, if developers are viewed as suppliers
it becomes clear that they are a strong force in the industry. In the current market,
with the high level of demand by investors for a scarce commodity which developers
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' Porter 1985, p. 5.
control, developers have substantial bargaining power. Developers have a much
stronger threat of forward integration than intermediaries do of backward integration
- that is, it is much easier for a developer to threaten to raise the capital on their own
than it is for an intermediary to threaten to develop property on their own.
7.2.3 Entry
As discussed above, the industry life cycle is largely driven by the entry of
competing firms. The actual progress of the industry life cycle is obviously highly
dependent upon the rate and the magnitude of entry of new firms. How quickly will
new firms enter, and how many new firms will enter? The more slowly entry occurs,
the longer that the initial period of high profitability will last. "[T]he possibility of
entry is fundamental to patterns of profitability in an industry."
The likelihood that firms will enter a market depends principally on whether
they expect that entering the industry will be profitable, and upon the size of those
profits." If there are industry characteristics which make it less likely that an
entrant will be profitable, that industry has barriers to entry." The potential
profitability of entry, and therefore the attractiveness of an industry to new entrants,
is influenced by three important factors: the likely reactions of firms already in the
industry to the new competitor; the advantages of existing industry participants; and
the costs of failure or exit costs. Assuming that the chances of a new firm successfully
entering the industry are less than 100%, there is some probability that a new entrant
8 Oster, p. 20-21.
9 Oster, p. 32, 36.
1" Oster, p. 35.
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will incur costs of failure, or exit costs. These exit costs are typically made up of the
irreversible investment made in entering an industry, which cannot be applied to
another industry.
Reaction of Existing Participants to New Entrants
There are three factors relating to the technology of an industry which
influence the reaction that a new entrant can expect from the firms already
participating in an industry.
Specific Assets. There is a set of tangible or intangible assets that is needed
to compete in any market. "To the extent that an organization's assets are specific to
a market and thus primarily valuable only in that market, that organization is likely
to fight harder to maintain its position in that market."" Many of the assets used
by the larger intermediary firms to compete are specific to the housing tax credit
industry. For example, the ongoing monitoring and management of the properties is
specialized, and the systems and experience applied do not easily transfer to other
businesses. These represent a substantial investment specific to the affordable
housing industry, and would tend to lead firms to react more strongly to new entrants.
Economies of Scale. In some industries, firms which produce larger volumes
can significantly lower their per unit costs. Of particular importance is the minimum
efficient scale of production, which is defined as the smallest volume for which unit
costs reach a minimum." This is primarily of importance in that it determines the
minimum size needed to enter a market, and therefore the share of the market needed
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for entry. If the share of the market needed for entry is high, a firm can expect a
more intense response from other firms already in the market, as well as a decrease
in prices after they enter the market. (Note, however, that product differentiation can
offset cost disadvantages by allowing a firm to charge a premium.)
There appear to be minor economies of scale in the housing tax credit industry.
In fact, there may in some respects be diseconomies of scale. Clearly the minimum
efficient scale of production is quite low; many small firms can participate effectively.
The cost disadvantage of small firms is not that severe, and cost efficiency is not yet
a key competitive issue in the industry.
However, there do appear to be some economies of scope in the housing tax
credit industry. In particular, firms can and do serve multiple segments effectively
because some portion of the processes by which they deliver value to the buyers are
shared in different segments. The principal example of this is illustrated by firms'
activities in the property market. The process of acquiring a tax credit property for
a group of individual investors may be nearly identical to the process of acquiring a
property for a group of corporations. The economies of scope arise, then, from greater
volume in processing property acquisitions and therefore reduced search and
transactions costs, as a proportion of capital raised. Property acquisitions are
obviously a central part of the process by which intermediaries create value for
investors, and excelling in property acquisition is therefore an very good example of
an area where a firm might lower costs or increase differentiation by providing
superior performance in that portion of the value chain."
1 Porter (1985) notes that costs of coordination, compromise and inflexibility in serving
multiple segments with shared activities can offset the economies in part or in whole.
Page 101
Excess Capacity. Some firms (and therefore their industries) have excess
capacity, with fixed costs which must be borne regardless of how much the firm
produces. Once a firm has committed to incur these fixed costs, it will be willing to
produce and sell its product at a price equal to its marginal cost of production. If an
industry has excess capacity, it makes price cutting more likely should a new firm
enter the market. This will deter new entrants. However, because fixed assets are
not a major part of the process of competing in the equity capital market, excess
capacity does not appear to be a method which is used or usable to deter entry.
Advantages of Existing Industry Participants
A new entrant may be at a competitive disadvantage relative to firms already
in a market for a number of reasons. Oster highlights four areas: (1) precommitment
contracts; (2) licenses and patents; (3) learning-curve effects; and (4) a pioneering-
brand advantage." These advantages are also referred to as first-mover advantages,
because they make an industry more profitable for existing participants than for new
entrants.
Precommitment Contracts. Firms often enter into contracts to buy or sell
products over a period of time. In particular, firms may use contracts as an entry-
deterring tool by obtaining exclusive access to either an essential input to their
production process or to a critical distribution channel for their product. 'TT]he value
of these contracts depends heavily on the uniqueness of the contracted supply." 5
" Oster, p. 48.
15 Oster, p. 49. Note that, in order for the firm to benefit from exclusive access to a
scarce resource, the firm must have better information about the scarcity (and
therefore value) of that resource than the organization that controls the resource.
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The resource in scarce supply, of course, is properties with tax credits. There
are relatively few formal precommitment contracts in the property market. Although
there is a tendency for developers to do a series of transactions with one intermediary,
neither party is typically formally bound to that arrangement. Therefore, potential
new entrants have access to developers.
In the equity capital market, there are some precommitment contracts in the
distribution of investments to individuals. The major brokerage firms who serve as
channels for distribution of tax credit investments to individuals generally distribute
only one intermediary's product at an given time. Therefore, certain established
intermediaries have an advantage over potential entrants. For example, Merrill
Lynch and PaineWebber sell a public fund only for The Richman Group, and Dean
Witter, Smith Barney Shearson, and Prudential sell only for The Boston Financial
Group. Legally, these agreements generally in force only while a particular fund is
being marketed. As a practical matter, though, these relationships have tended to
change slowly. However, as sales of public fund products have declined, the
importance of these precommitment contracts has declined.
There are relatively few examples of effective use of precommitment contracts
in connection with raising capital from corporations. Access to product has been
viewed as important by distribution channels, and some firms have therefore
negotiated exclusive arrangements to distribute intermediaries' products. For
example, Meridian, a specialty broker, currently serves as the sole channel for The
Related Companies and for Arcand. They also served the same role, for a time, for
SunAmerica. However, the intermediaries have not utilized contracts to tie up
distribution channels in order to limit entry to their markets. For example, although
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Boston Financial enjoyed virtually 100% market share in its segment for nearly two
years from 1990 to 1992, it did not require its distribution channels to enter into
contractual arrangements which would have deterred entry of competitors.
Licenses and Patents. If entry to an industry is controlled by the government
or by law, clearly new entry can be deterred (though not always eliminated).
Although there are certain securities regulations which must be complied with in
order to operate in the equity capital market, in general there are no laws, licenses
or patents which restrict entry to the equity capital market. For the most part,
product innovations cannot be protected and are therefore widely imitated if they
prove effective.
Of course, the process of credit allocation by the states, and the limits on the
amount of credit which can be allocated, limit entry into the property market.
However, the allocation of credit for a single property does not provide a developer
with a continuing share of the market. Clearly there is strong competition for credit
allocations among developers within most states. With each application round, all
potential applicants compete again for the available allocation. 6 Further, no single
developer has a significant share of the market, and new entrants are unlikely to gain
a significant share. Therefore, the regulation of credit allocations does not provide a
barrier to entry for developers.
Learning-Curve Effects. Firms often experience falling unit costs as cumulative
production increases. This is generally attributed to increasing labor productivity, as
16 Of course, in many instances the legal limit on the size of the market will displace the
market competition into the political process as developers use contacts to gain some
advantage in the allocation process.
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well as to improvements in distribution and the use of inputs. However, if the gains
from learning cannot be limited to a single firm, no entry barrier is created.
In general, it appears that gains from learning are disseminated quickly and
widely in the housing tax credit industry. Securities laws require disclosure of the
terms of the proposed investment. This disclosure can be analyzed by competitors to
determine many of the processes by which an intermediary adds value for its clients.
Furthermore, because the process does not rely upon fixed plant and equipment, once
a competitor has identified an innovation it can quickly be adopted. For example, the
terms of a product offering can be amended by a written supplement to the disclosure
documents. Because the industry is driven by tax and legal issues, it relies heavily
on a relatively small group of advisors. Often these attorneys and accountants view
it as their right, if not their obligation, to disclose the lessons learned by other
industry participants. Finally, while there presumably is some competitive advantage
in analyzing the feasibility of property investments which has been gained by firms
with many years of industry experience, it is difficult for investors to evaluate this
experience. As a result, whatever proprietary learning the more established
intermediaries have obtained appears not to have presented an insurmountable
barrier to recent entrants. In sum, then, learning-curve effects provide few barriers
to entry in the housing tax credit industry.
Pioneering Brand Advantages. In some industries, customers prefer existing
brands to new products. This seems principally motivated by risk. For search goods,
products for which a reasonably accurate judgement can be made by inspecting the
product, early entrants to a market will have little advantage. For experience goods,
which must be purchased and used to determine quality, pioneering brands may have
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a significant advantage. Customers who purchase a new brand of an experience good
incur a risk by doing so. If the costs of making a mistake are high, it will deter
consumers from purchase new products. Finally, if customers are satisfied with the
existing product, it makes them less likely to try a new product. Price discounting,
endorsements, and government certification may make customers more willing to try
a new brand. Investments in tax credit funds would clearly appear to be an
experience good. However, this has not in practice deterred many corporate investors
from investing with a number of intermediaries.
Exit Costs
Firms who are considering entering an industry must consider the probability
that they will not succeed, and evaluate the losses they will incur as a result of their
failed attempt to enter the industry. Exit costs may be the principal determinant of
entry to an industry.
[R]ecent research maintains that in the absence of exit costs, excess
profits will be very difficult to maintain. Should a profit-making
opportunity appear, firms will enter quickly, earn temporary, but
handsome profits, and then leave when the environment becomes less
favorable. This has come to be known as hit-and-run entry, and in
some industries it may hold down profits very effectively. It is only exit
costs that discourage firms from plunging into what appear to be high-
profit industries."
Exit costs are high primarily when a firm must commit a large amount of capital to
an industry and when that capital, once invested, cannot be recovered and used in
another industry. Another way of stating this is to say that exit costs are high when
large, irreversible commitments of capital must be made.
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As discussed above, for the most part large fixed investments of capital are not
necessary to compete in the equity capital market. Not surprisingly, the high level
of entry described in the quote from Oster appears to fit the actual experience quite
well.
In summary, then, the barriers to entry into the housing tax credit industry
are currently low. In addition, the profits are so high that they have to fall a great
deal before entry is deterred, that is, before entry appears unprofitable.
One might expect higher barriers to entry in the corporate investor segments
than in the individual segments, due to the greater sophistication of corporate
investors. However, it is again perhaps surprising to note that the barriers to entry
in the individual investor segments are higher than in the corporate investor
segments. In part, this is due to some first-mover advantages discussed above.
However, the principal reason is because the management of the brokerage firms,
which control access to the individual investor group, is generally more sophisticated
and selective in their review of products and intermediaries than are most
corporations. In addition, the costs of securities registration and printing are much
higher on products for individuals, and this represents a substantial exit cost, due to
the irreversible commitment of capital, which deters entry.
7.2.4 Rivalry Among Firms
While entry is typically the most important factor in evaluating an industry,
rivalry among existing firms can also have a substantial impact. In discussing rivalry
among firms, Oster notes that when the number of competitors in an industry is large,
there is typically more competition in an industry, principally because having many
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players makes it difficult for firms to coordinate market activities.18 In addition, if
the firms in an industry are similar in size, rivalry tends to be more intense. This
also appears as a result of the difficulty which numerous smaller firms have in
showing market leadership in such an industry."
The intense rivalry in the housing tax credit industry appears well explained
by these concepts. As shown in Chapter 5, there are many industry participants.
Furthermore, the share of the market which each intermediary enjoys is, broadly
speaking, comparable.
Section 7.3 A Strategic Map of the Equity Capital Market
Using the same variables as the segmentation matrix, Figure 7-3 provides a
strategic map of the housing tax credit equity capital market. The area of each circle
is proportionate to the capital raised by each of the firms shown.2 o In some respects,
there is a diversity of types of firms represented, including for-profit and non-profit,
as well as firms which raise funds from corporations and individuals. However, there
is also clearly a significant cluster in the for-profit, non-guaranteed sponsor group.
Figure 7-4 shows how dramatically the industry has shifted since 1990. The
broken circles show where firms were located on the strategic map in 1990; the solid
circles show firms in 1993. Reflective of the overall growth in the industry, each of
8Oster, p. 212.
'9 Oster, p. 212-213.
20 To smooth out some of the arbitrary effects of using a calendar year, an average of
capital raised was used, with the weighting based 25% on 1992 sales and 75% on 1993
sales.
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Figure 7-3
Buyer Strategic Map of the Housing Tax Credit Equity Capital Market
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Figure 7-4
Strategic Map of the Housing Tax Credit Equity Capital Industry
Shifts from 1990 to 1993
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these firms has increased the amount of capital raised, as reflected by the larger
circles representing 1993.
The dramatic shift of firms from the individual market to the corporate market
is also striking. Some firms have moved from one extreme, raising funds from
individuals, to the other, raising most or all of their funds from corporations. This
trend reflects the lower barriers to entry present in the corporate investor segments
of the industry. Figure 7-4 illustrates how the influx of corporate capital has
transformed the tax credit industry. As discussed in Chapter 8, it looks likely that
the movement toward the corporate investor will continue and accelerate, as the
corporate products begin to dominate the property market.
Section 7.4 Industry Groups
In some industries there are groups of firms with similar characteristics. To
understand the industry, it can be useful to understand these groups. Industry
groups operate at a level between the overall industry and the individual firm.
"Strategic groups are clusters of firms within an industry that have common specific
assets and thus follow common strategies in setting key decision variables."2 1 Of
course, there may be characteristics common to all firms in an industry, so it is
possible that most or all firms follow similar strategies at some times or in some
respects.
Clearly different firms in the industry have developed in different ways. What
causes firms to develop differently within industries? "In a new industry, considerable
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uncertainty faces early entrants. Consumer preferences are perhaps not even well
understood by consumers themselves."2 2 Firms make investments into strategic
assets based upon their estimation of consumer preferences. These early investments
affect firms' position in the industry. Therefore, the history of an industry is
important to understanding its current structure.
Different industry groups may respond very differently to changes in the
environment, such as demand changes, regulatory changes, or technological changes.
Barriers to entry may be different for different industry groups. We need to look at
entry into the groups, as well as mobility between the groups.
The cells in Figure 7-2 present the strategic groups in one fashion, with
detailed lists of the firms in each segment. Figure 7-3 illustrates the groups
effectively. When viewed together with the trend shown in Figure 7-4, it becomes
clear how large the for-profit sponsor group has become. (Keep in mind that Figures
7-3 and 7-4 omit many smaller firms.) In addition, many firms have crowded into the
corporate area of the strategic map in recent years. This helps to explain the high
level of rivalry in those strategic groups.
There are two other strategic groups as well: corporate guarantors, and non-
profit syndicators. Two firms hold most of the market in each of the respective
segments. Rivalry is low.
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Chapter 8
The Housing Tax Credit Industry as a System
We have reviewed the equity capital market in Chapter 5 and the property market in
Chapter 6, and analyzed the industry in Chapter 7. This chapter now returns to the
overview of the industry which was discussed briefly in Chapter 4.
Section 8.1 A Systems View
"Dynamic complexity arises when cause and effect are distant in time and
space, and when the consequences over time of interventions are subtle and not
obvious to many participants in the system."' The tax credit industry fits that
description well. Figure 8-1 provides a detailed view of how the equity capital market
and the property market combine to form the housing tax credit industry. (It may
also be helpful to review Figure 4-2 to keep the overall perspective.) The equity
capital market and the property market combine to form a larger, complex
interrelated system. While this may seem apparent, particularly given the discussion
up to this point, this overall view clearly has not been apparent to many industry
participants until recently, if at all.
We have reviewed a number of changes which have occurred in the tax credit
industry in the past twenty-four months. Capital investment by corporations has
increased greatly, but yields to those investors are lower and fees to brokers are
substantially lower. As will be discussed below, the primary forces behind the
1 Peter M. Senge, "The Leader's New Work: Building Learning Organizations,"
Sloan Management Review, 32:1 (Fall 1990a), p. 15.
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The Housing Tax Credit Industry
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changes in the industry were the actions of the industry participants. In particular,
the efforts by brokers to increase the number of firms investing in the industry and
to increase the number of intermediaries which those investors invested with were
major factors. The decision by corporations to invest with multiple intermediaries was
a substantial factor as well. Inasmuch as investors and brokers were the most
adversely affected by these changes, it is reasonable to conclude that they did not
anticipate the changes which their actions would bring.
There are a number of reasons why industry participants have not had a wider
understanding of their industry. First, the industry is, as has been discussed earlier,
a relatively new industry. It has undergone steady change since the housing tax
credit program commenced in 1987. So the industry itself has been evolving, and of
course industry participants' views have been evolving as well. Industry participants
have not seen the entire industry system. Furthermore, industry participants have
not of course had the benefit of hindsight. What appear in 1994 to have been
inexorable trends were not so apparent in 1992.
Second, the asset which is generating the investment is affordable housing.
For the most part, the industry was formed by firms who had background and
experience in the affordable housing industry. However, the housing tax credit
industry evolved in ways which were not necessarily well-suited to the strengths of
many of those firms. For example, structuring and marketing financial products to
corporations was something few firms had meaningful experience with. As a result,
most firms learned new lessons as the industry evolved. Competitors and market
forces emerged unexpectedly from areas which were beyond the edges of their mental
map of the industry. The system came to include some participants with which they
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were not familiar. For example, recently firms with financial resources and
sophistication are increasing their influence, relative to firms which have a
background in affordable housing. First Chicago used its experience in structuring
and marketing tax-oriented investments in equipment leasing for corporations to
significantly change the industry, as is discussed in Section 8.3 below. In addition,
the firms with affordable housing experience, and the channels they used, were
generally small firms without strong management or planning capabilities.
Finally, housing tax credit industry participants merely suffered from the same
limitations we all tend to have. In particular, those shortcomings include a tendency
to think "locally," to focus on our immediate environment without understanding the
interconnections which tie that environment to more distant events and systems; and
the tendency to have a short-term perspective, to measure results by what happens
this week or this year without considering the longer-term effects. "[W]e tend to focus
on snapshots of isolated parts of the system."2
8.1.1 The Importance of a Systems View
Viewing the housing tax credit industry as a system allows us to begin to
understand the industry structure which causes the behavior of the industry. We can
illuminate the distant and subtle interrelationships and understand the consequences
of industry participants.
Richmond outlines several systems thinking skills: dynamic thinking, or seeing
behavior patterns rather than focusing on particular events or attempting to predict
2 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning
Organization, Doubleday, New York, 1990b, p. 7.
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the specific results that may occur; closed-loop thinking, or understanding that the
elements of a system interact such that neither is solely a cause or effect, but they
mutually influence each other;generic thinking, or understanding that the system, not
necessarily the individuals or firms who are part of it, generate behavior; operational
thinking, or focusing on how the various elements of a system actually influence each
other rather than noting that they tend to merely be correlated in some fashion; and
continuum thinking, which reminds us that the behavior and relationships in a part
of the system do not remain constant, but that they may change depending upon the
level of a certain variable. An example of this latter point is that, as water supplies
are depleted, rationing may be implemented and water consumption patterns may
change.' The discussion in this chapter relies upon these concepts.
8.1.2 The Limited Size of the Property Market
A central feature of the tax credit industry, which has been discussed in
various contexts elsewhere, is that the amount of tax credit is strictly limited by
Federal law. As a result, the amount of activity in the property market is limited.
Therefore, of course, so is the size of the equity capital market.
As noted in Chapter 3, states can allocate only $1.25 of tax credit per capital.
If there are 255 million people in the United States, that permits a total of $319
million of annual tax credit to be allocated, or a ten-year amount totalling $3.19
billion. If equity prices are currently 53 to 55 cents per dollar of tax credit, that
a Another way to state this is, "It's the relationships, not the numbers, that
deserve primary attention." High Performance Systems, Introduction to
Systems Thinking and ithink, Hanover, New Hampshire, 1994, p. 15.
4 Barry Richmond, "Systems thinking: critical thinking skills for the 1990s and
beyond," System Dynamics Review, 9:2 (Summer 1993), pp. 113-133.
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implies capital invested in properties of $1.7-1.8 billion per year. If the costs of
raising capital, together with operating reserves, are 15-20% of the capital raised, then
the theoretical maximum size of the equity capital market is between $2.0 and $2.2
billion per year. Note that this assumes that every dollar of tax credit is utilized in
the year in which it initially becomes available.
The limited size of the property market gives us a good example of the need for
continuum thinking. Approximately $1.9 billion was raised in the equity capital
market in 1993. Given the substantial margin for error in the data on how much tax
credit is actually used and how much capital was actually raised, it is reasonable to
conclude that the industry is at or near its theoretical maximum size. Therefore, the
trends discussed in Chapter 5 cannot continue in a linear fashion indefinitely - the
behavior of the system will begin to change as we reach the limits of this part of the
system. For example, it possible that as the system reaches this limits there will be
a more drastic behavior, such as an even sharper rise in prices and a concurrent sharp
drop in yields.
Note that rising prices for tax credits may allow the amount of capital raised
to grow for a time, even though the amount of tax credits is fixed, until supply and
demand reach equilibrium. Fundamentally, though, this does not change the
limitations imposed on the industry by the limits on the amount of tax credit.
Section 8.2 The Rise of Corporate Investors
As discussed in Section 5.3, equity capital investment by corporate investors
has risen sharply in recent years. Following the history of the industry over this
period illustrates its behavior as a system.
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The tax credit program became effective in 1987. There were many features
of the program which suggested that it would be an attractive investment for
corporations. Unlike individuals, corporations could use unlimited amounts of tax
credits, and could benefit from the tax losses as well. Nonetheless, initial efforts to
raise capital met only limited success. As discussed in Chapter 5, non-profit
intermediaries were able to raise capital in slowly increasing amounts over time. In
addition, many banks invested in early partnerships in order to obtain credit toward
their Community Reinvestment Act obligations. However, the complexities of the
1986 tax act which created the LIHC program also gave corporations a great many
other issues to address before they could turn to learning about housing tax credits.
In addition, the collapse of the real estate sector of the economy deterred many
investors. The related collapse of many banking institutions removed those corporate
investors from the market as well. In addition, it may also be that the intermediaries'
lack of experience with marketing to corporations prevented them from mounting an
effective effort to raise capital from corporations.
In late 1989, in response to declining sales to individual investors,
intermediaries began pursuing corporate investors more actively. In 1990, Boston
Financial became the first for-profit intermediary to successful structure and market
a large tax credit fund for individuals. Boston Financial raised approximately $25
million from corporate investors in 1990, which today looks like a small amount but
at the time exceeded expectations. This was the beginning of the rise of the corporate
investor in the housing tax credit industry.
Numerous other firms attempted to offer a similar product. Shortly thereafter,
SunAmerica (then known as Broad) succeeded in raising capital from investors with
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a product which provided certain guarantees to investors, a markedly different
product. Boston Financial and Broad could, at that time, satisfy the entire demand
of the market. Boston Financial was perceived at that time as offering the highest
level of safety and quality. Similarly, the guarantee features of the Broad product
addressed the concerns of early investors about risk. None of the other for-profit
sponsors were successful in raising significant amounts of capital from corporations.
Over time, however, gradual processes were gradually changing the equity
capital market. Corporations were increasingly becoming aware of the housing tax
credit program. What had once been an unusual, risky investment became
increasingly accepted. An officer of a corporation no longer had to worry that he was
betting his career if he recommended the investment. In particular, corporations
became increasing aware of how housing tax credits could increase the reported
earnings of the corporation. As discussed earlier, the ability to increase earnings is
the principal reason why corporations invest in housing tax credits. The level of
awareness, acceptance and demand began to rise.'
Of course, a significant factor in this was the ongoing marketing efforts of the
various channels and intermediaries in the equity capital market. In particular, a
small group of brokers recognized the opportunity to make large sums of money by
raising capital from corporations for intermediaries. At that time, the fees paid to
these brokers were typically 4-5% of the capital raised. Brokers began to solicit
increasing numbers of corporations.
s Perhaps this illustrates Senge's comment that "the primary threats to our
survival ... come not from sudden events but from slow, gradual processes."
Senge, 1990b, p. 22.
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These brokers saw their first success, and the development of the corporate
investor market took its next step, when corporations began investing in funds which
invested principally in Farmers Home properties. Corporations perceived lower levels
of risk in these properties, due to the large amounts of financing and operating
subsidy typically provided to those properties. This lower risk from property
operations was viewed as offsetting the relative inexperience and lack of resources of
newer, smaller intermediaries. Firms such as Arcand were among the next to begin
to have success raising capital from corporations.
As a result, the intense rivalry now present in the industry first appeared
among intermediaries who invested in Farmers Home properties, and it is interesting
to note that the pattern of behavior foreshadows the behavior of the larger industry
system. Corporations began investing substantial sums of capital with a number of
intermediaries. The result was numerous intermediaries with large amounts of
capital pursuing a highly limited supply of suitable properties. Not surprisingly, this
resulted in intense competition among intermediaries who were seeking the rights to
invest in those properties. The sharp upward trend in prices shown in Figure 5-9 was
preceded - and perhaps presaged - by the earlier upward trend in prices in the
Farmers Home market.'
The pattern of behavior within the Farmers Home market was evocative of that
generated by what Senge calls the "escalation" system archetype.
6 It is expected that Federal appropriations for Farmers Home subsidies will be
cut by 50%. As the effects of this reach the equity capital market, the behavior
of the Farmers Home sector of the industry may provide some useful lessons
to industry participants.
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Two people or organizations each see their welfare as depending on a
relative advantage over the other. Whenever one side gets ahead, the
other is more threatened, leading it to act more aggressively to
reestablish its advantage, which threatens the first, increasing its
aggressiveness, and so on. Often each side sees its own aggressive
behavior as a defensive response to the other's aggression; but each side
acting "in defense" results in a buildup that goes far beyond either
side's desires.7
The intermediaries competing for the right to invest in Farmers Home properties
sought advantage over their competitors by offering higher prices and less stringent
terms. This, of course, elicited a competitive response which further escalated the
price and softened the terms. Currently, the price escalation continues. Terms
appear to have settled to the minimum level that corporate investors will accept, so
to some degree that aspect of the competition has ended.
As corporations became more comfortable with the tax credit as an investment,
they began to perceive less risk in other types of tax credit properties as well, and
their interest in investing rose. In addition, brokers were anxious to maximize the
volume of capital invested in order to maximize their own profits. Often, once
corporations made the decision to invest, they wished to invest large sums of money
so that they could have a material impact on their firm's earnings. Several firms had
a target of $50 to $100 million each year. In late 1992 and early 1993, corporations
began to invest substantial sums of capital. This coincides with the beginning of the
sharp rise in investment by corporations, as well as the beginning of the rise in prices
for properties, the decline in yields, and the decline in fees and costs. Corporate
investment rose from approximately $340 million in 1991, to $670 million in 1992 and
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$1.41 billion in 1993. A similar scenario to that which occurred in the Farmers Home
sector was then repeated in the larger equity capital and property markets.
The total capital which corporations were trying to invest was testing the limits
of the industry's ability to invest that capital. In late 1992, the equity capital market
reached the point where corporations wanted to invest more capital with the
established intermediaries than the intermediaries had the capacity to accept. The
response of brokers and corporate investors to that situation has had a profound
impact on the subsequent history of the industry: they turned to other intermediaries
who would accept the funds and attempt to invest them. In late 1992 and early 1993,
then, the number of intermediaries raising capital from corporations proliferated.
The objectives of brokers in taking this step seems clear. Their fees were a
percentage of the capital invested. The larger the amount of capital invested, the
greater their profits. The objectives of the corporations were to invest the sums they
had targeted for investment, so that they could earn a return on that capital, and to
reduce their risk by diversifying their investments beyond one or two intermediaries
who might later face unexpected financial difficulties.
Diversification is, of course, part of the conventional wisdom of investing. If
corporate investors had considered the limited capacity of the housing tax credit
industry to accept investment, though, they might have questioned the conventional
wisdom. It is unclear whether corporations achieved their objective of reducing risk
through diversification. The risk of investing with a single intermediary which might
later fail was presumably reduced by investing with several intermediaries. However,
the competitive environment which the influx of capital created probably increased the
risk of all intermediaries facing problems. Property diversification may only have
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been achieved in part, in that in many cases intermediaries seeking to invest the same
investors' capital were competing against each other for the same properties.
Corporations achieved their objective of increasing the amount of capital which
they could invest. The total capital invested in the tax credit industry increased by
108% from 1990 to 1993. The competition among intermediaries inspired some
innovation to find ways to increase the industry's capacity to invest. However, part
of the progress which corporations made in investing large amounts resulted merely
because prices rose. For example, mathematically changing the yield on an
investment from 17% to 12% will increase the amount invested by 25%.
It is not clear whether, if corporations and brokers had anticipated the results,
they would have taken the actions which they did take. (This is discussed briefly in
Chapter 9.) The results which occurred may be an inevitable result of the structure
of the system, although the speed at which change has occurred could clearly have
been changed if different actions had been taken. However, it does seem clear that
the actions of brokers and investors clearly led, through the dynamics of the housing
tax credit industry, to substantial changes in the industry; that those changes had
some significant adverse effects for brokers and investors, as well as some other
industry participants; and those changes were not fully anticipated by industry
participants.
Two other factors have likely contributed to the pace of change. First, in
August, 1993 Federal legislation was enacted which made the tax credit program a
permanent feature of the tax code. This affected the industry in two ways. The
permanent extension gave corporations greater confidence that the program would be
in place for some time to come. This alleviated two concerns of corporate investors:
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that they would invest time in understanding a program that would expire before they
had the opportunity to invest significant amounts; and that, if they invested in tax
credits, Congress would later eliminate their ability to use the credits in the same way
it had eliminated the ability of individuals to use tax benefits in the 1986 tax act. In
addition, the permanent extension meant that the housing tax credit industry would
continue to exist for some time, which made the industry more attractive to new
entrants.
The second factor which contributed to the pace of change was the recovery of
the nation's economy and the resulting increase in corporate profits and corporate tax
bills. This obviously gave more corporations an interest in methods of reducing their
taxes.
While, as noted, both the permanent extension and the economic recovery
probably accelerated the pace of change, they does not have appeared to have affected
the fundamental course of that change. Rather, the changes have been developing for
some time and appear to flow from the structure of the industry rather than changes
in environmental variables.
Section 8.3 Effects of Large Scale Investment by Corporate Investors
The large scale investment by corporate investors with multiple intermediaries
in the housing tax credit industry since 1992 has had a number of important effects
on the industry, beyond the price and yield effects. These effects include a declining
role for the individual investor; substantial changes in products, distribution channels,
and pricing; a convergence of the equity capital market and the property market;
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increasing levels of sophistication; and changes in the economics and efficiency of the
program. Each of these effects is discussed below.
8.3.1 The Decline of the Individual Investor
As noted above, increased capital investment by corporations has led to higher
prices paid for tax credits and associated lower yields to investors. Of course, the
effects of increased market prices for credits impact not only corporate investors, but
individual investors as well. To date, investors have absorbed declines in yields. At
the same time, intermediaries have reduced costs in order to offer both competitive
yields to investors and competitive prices to developers.
However, the investment products offered to corporations are much better to
suited to adjustments to the new market conditions. As a result, individual investors
have a decreasing role in the equity capital market and may soon disappear
altogether.
Investor capital is not currently a scarce resource in the industry; feasible
properties with a tax credit allocation are the scarce resource. So the long term
viability of a tax credit investment product depends principally on whether that
product generates a competitive offer to developers. As discussed in Chapter 5, price
and terms are the two principal dimensions of an offer to a developer. Price is
generally considered to be the most important. The price which a tax credit fund can
pay to a developer is largely a function of two elements: the costs of raising the
capital, and the yield required by the investors.
Costs. The costs involved in public funds appear to be much less susceptible
to significant reduction than the costs for corporate investors. Public funds typically
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use approximately 20-23% of the funds raised to pay the costs of raising the capital
and fees to the channels and the intermediaries.
A significant portion of the front-end fees, typically 6-8%, are paid to the
brokerage firms used to distribute the product. However, although the costs are high
there appear to be few alternative means of distribution. In order to reach the large
numbers of individual investors needed to raise substantial sums for this relatively
unusual investment, it appears necessary to use brokerage firms.
In addition, the costs of registering the product with state and Federal
securities regulators is substantial, as is the cost of preparing and distributing costly
written marketing and disclosure material to thousands of brokers and potential
investors. Registration, legal and printing expenses can easily amount to from several
hundred thousand dollars to over a million dollars for a public fund. In summary,
then, it appears difficult to reduce the costs of distributing a housing tax credit
product to individual investors.
In contrast, adjusted to be comparable, at least one current corporate fund has
front-end fees of under 10%, less than half the level of a typical public fund. The
corporate funds are not subject to registration with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and are not typically reviewed by state regulators either. Printing costs
can be much reduced, because the number of copies that must be distributed is much
smaller and the materials typically include little if any elaborate color printing, as
marketing materials for individual investors do. Effective distribution of a corporate
product can be done very cost effectively by either a channel or by an affiliate of the
8 An addition 3-5% of the capital raised is used to fund a working capital
reserve, in both public funds and corporate funds.
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intermediary. With each firm often willing to invest from several million to twenty
million dollars in a particular fund, it is not necessary to contact wide numbers of
potential investors. Fees paid to channels for selling the product currently range from
0-4%, with the trend clearly downward. In addition, the other costs associated with
raising capital through a corporate fund will likely continue to fall at least slightly as
well.
It is also important to note that, because products for corporate investors are
substantially exempt from securities registration, new products can be introduced
rapidly. The terms can be adjusted, and yields and costs can quickly be changed.
Public funds, which can take several months to complete the registration process, are
at a distinct disadvantage in a rapidly changing market.
Yield. While costs are a significant factor in determining the relative market
effectiveness of an individual investor product versus a corporate product, yields are
obviously an important issue as well. In a mathematical sense, it is generally true
that the yield on the investment is a function of (1) the amount paid to the developer
for the tax credit property investments and (2) the costs associated with raising and
investing the capital. Of course, it is ultimately the yield required by investors which
sets the price paid to developers. A critical factor in determining investor yield
requirements is risk. The risks of tax credit investments are discussed below.
As stated above, the scarce resource in the industry is tax credit properties.
Investors for which the combination of yield requirements and costs associated with
raising and investing their capital result in higher prices to developers will have a
substantial advantage in competing for properties.
Page 128
However, note that different investors may receive a different yield from the
same investment. As discussed in Chapter 3, individual investors generally cannot
use the tax losses generated by the properties, while corporations can use the tax
losses. As a result, even if an individual investor and a corporate investor invested
in the same property, they would each receive a different investment return.
The costs of raising capital from corporate investors have been lower all along.
The first corporate fund introduced in 1990 had lower front-end costs than public
funds. However, corporations required a higher yield than individual investors. As
shown in Figure 5-10, the internal rate of return on early investments by corporations
were approximately 17%. (This includes the benefits from both tax credits and tax
losses.) This higher yield requirement offset the cost advantage of corporate funds,
with the result that corporate products did not have a competitive advantage over
public funds.
Since 1992, however, the yields to corporate investors have dropped sharply,
as have costs. (See Figure 5-10.) Currently, corporate fund products are beginning
to show a significant advantage in competing on price for property investments. As
discussed above, the size of the equity capital market - the amount of investor capital
needed by the industry - is limited. The current level of demand by corporations
indicates that they are willing to invest all of the capital needed by the industry.
With the possible exception of certain niches or certain property types, it appears
likely that individual investors will quickly vanish from the equity capital market.
In addition to the influx of corporate capital, other industry trends are
contributing to the decline of the individual investor. Public fund sales throughout
the industry are down significantly. For example, Boston Capital, which raised the
Page 129
largest amount of capital from individuals in 1993, reports that their 1994 sales pace
is down by 50%. The continuing negative publicity about real estate limited
partnerships formed in the 1980s is often cited as one factor. For example,
unsuccessful real estate partnerships sold by Prudential Securities, and other
sponsors, have regularly been topics in the business press. Of course, to the extent
an investor has himself been disappointed by a partnership investment, he is less
likely to invest. Other factors contributing to the decline in capital raised may include
rising interest rates, which make competing investments more attractive; turbulent
financial markets; and saturation of the market, as individual investors reach the
legal limits of how much credit they can use.
One industry observer who was involved in the creation of the enabling
legislation in 1986 has noted that Congress believed that corporations would be the
principal investors in tax credits. While it has taken seven years for corporate
investors to accept the product and assume the role of the primary source of capital,
it appears the expectations of Congress are finally being met.
8.3.2 Changes in Products, Distribution Channels, and Pricing
Equity capital investment by corporations is fundamentally changing the equity
capital market. As discussed above, corporate capital is displacing the individual
investor. In addition, of course, yields to investors are sharply lower. There are other
changes as well, particularly in the types of investment products, in the distribution
of those investment products, and in the pricing of products.
Products. Since corporate investors began investing in housing tax credits, the
products have changed significantly. The guaranteed products are the most striking
example of this change. While it is possible that a guaranteed product for individuals
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might have evolved, and may still evolve, the participation of corporate investors made
it far more likely. The level of review and disclosure
product for individuals, in connection with securities
introduction of such a product. In addition, all of the
above regarding individual investors would apply.
There have been other, more subtle, changes in
corporate investments and the corporation's preferences
and terms have reduced the product standardization
growing trend toward individual negotiations of terms
of the terms of a guaranteed
registration, discourages the
cost considerations discussed
products as well. The size of
for more customized products
in the industry. There is a
for each investor.
In addition, some corporations have a much stronger geographic preference
than individuals did. Many corporations prefer to invest near their headquarters or
other facilities. In particular, banks can receive credit toward their Community
Reinvestment Act obligations by investing in tax credit properties in the area they
serve. This gives banks a strong geographic preference in the investments which they
make.
Finally, corporations are markedly different from individuals in that some are
willing to invest directly into properties, without using intermediaries. Some
corporations have internal real estate groups or other expertise, and have decided that
they are able to assess the risks of investments, select properties, and monitor them
without the assistance of intermediaries. This is not entirely surprising, in that many
corporations who are engaged principally in one business will, for various reasons,
often have small groups who are engaged in substantially different businesses.
Although there has been direct investment by corporations since the program began,
the recent increase in investments by corporations has increased the interest of firms
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in direct investments in properties. (In some ways, of course, increase in direct
investment could be viewed as both a change in product type and a change in
distribution.) In addition, the increase in direct investment likely reflects a
reassessment of the risk of a tax credit investment. Corporations see housing tax
credit properties as less risky than they did in the past.
Distribution. Corporate investment has also changed the distribution channels
in the housing tax credit industry. If individual investors cease to be a significant
source of capital, of course, the brokerage firms which serve as a channel for that
investment will cease their participation in the industry as well.
In addition, the increase in corporate investment has changed the way the
product is distributed to corporate investors as well. From 1990 until 1993, much of
the capital raised from corporations was raised by a relatively small group of five or
six specialty brokers whose primary or sole focus was marketing this type of product.
In the past six to twelve months, though, that has changed significantly. SunAmerica
ended its exclusive distribution arrangement with one such firm and engaged First
Chicago, a national bank. The group within First Chicago which markets this product
also markets tax-oriented leveraged equipment leasing products, such as equity in rail
cars and airplanes, to corporations. In addition, Boston Financial recently stopped
marketing its corporate tax credit funds through these specialty brokers and is
distributing its current product without using a channel. The increasing capital
raised has, as discussed, put pressure on yields and costs of raising capital, and some
intermediaries have concluded that the value added by the former distribution
channels is not commensurate with the costs, and have therefore ceased using those
channels or have reduced the fees paid for distribution.
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Pricing. The most dramatic change which has resulted from the changing
distribution channels, however, has been in the method by which tax credit product
for corporations is priced by some intermediaries. Typically, an intermediary would
organize a tax credit fund and offer it to investors with a schedule of benefit objectives
and a fixed price, which together implied a certain target yield to the investor. Both
Mission First Financial and SunAmerica have, in the past six months, utilized a
request for proposals format in which investors submit a proposed price - in effect, a
bid. If the amount of capital which investors propose to invest exceeds the amount
sought by the intermediary, the intermediary will select the proposals which offer the
highest amount of capital to the intermediary (and thus the lowest yield to the
investor).
The results have been startling. Until 1993, for example, SunAmerica priced
its investments to yield a 15% rate of return to the investors. In early 1994, using the
request for proposals format, they were able to obtain investor capital at an estimated
8 to 9% yield. As a result, they were able to earn an enormous windfall profit due to
the change in distribution and the change in the pricing method. Industry observers
estimate that SunAmerica raised approximately $90 million for properties in which
they had invested approximately $50 million. That obviously implies a $40 million
profit, which is an enormous margin compared to industry norms. The full impact of
this development has probably not yet fully unfolded. For example, SunAmerica
could, rather than seek huge margins, choose to lower its margins somewhat and raise
prices paid to developers. This could significantly affect the property and equity
capital markets.
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8.3.3 Convergence of the Equity Capital Market and the Property Market
A third major change which has resulted from the rise of investment by
corporations has been a move toward a partial convergence of the equity capital
market and the property market. When individual investors dominated the for-profit
equity capital market, the separation between the equity capital market and the
property market was almost complete.' Neither individuals nor developers
understood each other well, and there was virtually no contact between the majority
of individual investors and developers. Few individual investors would consider
investing directly into properties, and few developers sought investment directly from
individuals, in part because the costs were prohibitive, in terms of time, uncertainty
and money.
Currently, however, corporations have increasing involvement and influence
in the property market. The concentration of the sources of capital, with many
corporations investing tens of millions of dollars each year, has of course been an
important reason why this has occurred. In addition, a $30 to $50 million dollar
investment by a corporation over a one year period can have a significant influence
on the market.
Of course, the partial convergence of the two markets is best illustrated by
direct transactions between corporations and developers. More corporations are
9 For the purposes of this discussion, it is useful to think of the for-profit and
non-profit intermediaries as operating somewhat separately; there is still
relatively little overlap and competition between them, although the increasing
competition for tax credit properties may change that. In addition, in the non-
profit area, there is still considerable separation between the non-profit equity
capital market and the non-profit property market.
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making, or considering making, direct investments in properties. More developers are
raising capital directly from corporations or through finders.
8.3.4 Increasing Sophistication
As noted above, the majority of industry participants to date (except for
investors) became involved because of their background in affordable housing. In
particular, the intermediaries have had the most significant role in shaping the
industry. Intermediaries have operated in both the equity capital market and the
property market, and have to some degree controlled the flows of capital, benefits, and
information between the two markets.
However, the intermediary firms are typically not sophisticated in many
respects, such as size, financial resources, and management. The largest
intermediaries have fewer than 200 employees, if property management personnel in
the field are excluded.1 * Most intermediaries have less than 50, and some as few as
10-15, employees. In general, the financial resources of the firms, in terms of net
worth and access to capital and credit, are quite limited. The net worth of most of the
firms is under $15 million, and much of that is unavailable for use as capital to
finance industry activities." Finally, the management of almost all of the firms is
10 SunAmerica is the exception, in that its insurance and financial services
activities employ several thousand employees. However, the housing tax credit
is not a principal business of the firm, and reportedly fewer than ten people
work in the area. Furthermore, although SunAmerica has played a significant
role in shaping the industry, it has not been as aggressive or active a
participant as it might have been.
n For example, SunAmerica appears to be the only significantly active firm to
date with access to relatively large amounts of capital. They have used that
capital to operate in a significantly different manner than other industry
participants. SunAmerica has acquired an inventory of tax credit properties,
(continued...)
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comprised of executives whose background is as a practitioner in finance or affordable
housing. Few of the firms have senior executives who have a strong background in
management and planning. Many of the firms appear to have weaknesses in internal
controls and administration.
In part, the pace at which the industry has matured can be explained by the
legislative history of the program. As noted above, the program had an initial term,
and was extended three times before being made permanent in 1993. The uncertain
future of the program appears to have deterred entry into the industry by larger, more
sophisticated firms. This has effectively sheltered the smaller firms in the industry
from competition with firms with greater resources.
However, the permanent extension of the tax credit program, together with the
increasing levels of awareness and acceptance of housing tax credit investments
among corporations, is clearly attracting new entrants to the industry. The increased
competition by itself has spurred increasing levels of sophistication, as existing
intermediaries strive to gain a competitive advantage and erect barriers to entry. In
addition, there may be opportunities for firms with access to capital and other
"(...continued)
held the properties until construction is complete, and then raised capital from
investors at that point, when the flow of tax benefits is ready to commence.
This has allowed them to earn significant profits, both because the value of the
assets increases over this holding period and because market prices for the
credits have been steadily rising. Of course, there is also a risk that asset
values could decline. However, their role as a principal which may gain or lose
as asset values change is distinctly different from the way the other
intermediaries function in this industry. In general, other firms receive a fee
which is a fixed percentage of capital raised, and act as a pure intermediary
in the sense that changes in asset values affect the developers and the
investors, but generally do not affect the intermediary. This method of doing
business has allowed these intermediaries to function without access to
substantial capital resources.
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resources. For example, should a guaranteed product become the dominant product
in the industry, firms with access to greater resources would have a decisive
advantage. In fact, such firms are rumored to be considering entry into the industry
in some fashion. For example, reportedly Society Bank of Ohio is considering offering
a product similar to that offered by SunAmerica. Of course, it may be that entry by
such firms, or alliances of current intermediaries with such firms, will be necessary
for the industry to evolve to the point where a resource-intensive product becomes the
dominant product. In any case, levels of sophistication have increased and it appears
likely that the trend will continue.
8.3.5 Economics and Efficiency of the Program
The fifth major set of changes which has resulted from the influx of corporate
capital has been a modification of the economics of the industry. One consequence of
this is an improvement in the efficiency of the program from a public policy point of
view.
Although the amount of tax credit which can be allocated is limited, the rise
in prices for tax credits provides more equity capital in total to build affordable
housing. As discussed in Chapter 3, the state allocating agencies are required to
allocate only enough tax credit to make the property feasible. Therefore, although one
might initially conclude that rising tax credit prices create windfalls for developers,
this is not true in the long term, and may not even be true in the short term.
The state allocating agencies use what is called the "equity gap" method to
calculate the amount of tax credit to allocate to a property. The agencies evaluate the
amount needed to develop the property, which includes a development fee for the
developer. The difference between the development cost of the property and the
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amount of mortgage financing available is referred to as the equity gap. The equity
gap is the amount of equity capital needed to develop the property. The tax credit
allocation can be determined by dividing the equity gap by the current price for tax
credits." The higher the price for tax credits, the less tax credit is needed to fill the
equity gap for a particular property. For example, if a property has an equity gap of
$2,000,000 and the price for tax credits is 46.6 cents for each dollar of tax credit over
the ten year credit period, that implies total tax credits of $2,000,000/.466 or
$4,291,845 over ten years, which requires an annual allocation of $429,185. If tax
credit prices rise to 54.8 cents, an annual allocation of $364,964 is sufficient to fill the
equity gap. Clearly, this would allow the agency to meet the equity capital needs of
more properties with the limited amount of total tax credit.
As long as state agencies remain abreast of changes in the price for tax credits,
then, in the long run higher prices will result in less credit being allocated to a
particular property, not a windfall profit to the property's developer. This is a critical
point for policymakers to understand. The proper administration of the program by
the state agencies adds substantially to the effectiveness of the tax credit program.
Of course, given the long time frame for developing a property, it is possible
that prices could rise between the date upon which the state agency determines the
appropriate amount of the allocation. If the agency takes no action, this delay could
in the short term result in greater than anticipated developer profits. However, the
2 At any point in time prices for tax credits vary, based on a number of factors
such as location, property quality, developer group, whether the property also
benefits from historic tax credits, financing, the amount of tax deductions, and
other factors. It is more accurate to use the current price for tax credits, for
this property specifically or for a property of its type more generally.
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state agency is empowered by law to review and adjust the amount of credit allocated
to a property when it is placed in service, so even this unanticipated effect can be
avoided.
In addition to allowing state agencies to produce more housing, the changes in
the economics of the industry have improved the efficiency of the program. The term
efficiency is used in the sense that the cost, to the Federal government, of achieving
the objectives of the low income housing credit program are lower on a per unit basis.
The prices used in the example above are approximately correct market prices for
1992 and 1994 - the price paid for tax credits rose from approximately 46.6 cents to
approximately 54.8 cents." In other words, states are now able to generate 17.6%
more equity capital from a dollar of tax credit that they were in 1992.
These changes in the economics of the program have substantially improved
the efficiency of the low income housing credit program. Roughly speaking, it costs
the United States Treasury 17.6% less, in terms of foregone revenue to the Treasury,
to produce a unit of housing than it did in 1992.
Of course, that is a relative measure of efficiency, comparing the program at
two points in time. That view offers clarity and accuracy, but does not answer the
questions that have often been raised about the absolute efficiency of the program.
For example, some observers have, in effect, compared the prices paid for credits to
1 These price figures do not represent the average prices paid over the course of
the respective year; no such data exists. Rather, these prices are the derived
prices at a given point in time. In a rising market, it is reasonable to assume
that property investments for which negotiations concluded earlier would have
received a lower price and property investments negotiated later would receive
a higher price. Also, as noted above prices vary depending upon certain
characteristics of the property and the developer.
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the cost of foregone taxes, in present value terms, to the Treasury. The alternative
suggested is a direct cash subsidy, rather than a tax credit. It is beyond the scope of
this work to construct a measure of the absolute efficiency of the program. Such a
measure would have to incorporate a number of items, such as including the cost of
the tax deductions allowed as well as the tax credits. Further, it is not clear that such
a measure would resolve the efficiency debate, in that there are no successful
alternative programs to compare with the LIHC program. In addition, it would likely
to be quite difficult to get measures of efficiency that were both accurate, in that they
included all costs of the programs, as well as objective, in that most of the discussion
on this subject appears strongly influenced by the biases of the authors."
The use of a tax credit clearly introduces costs into the program. For example,
because developers must find investors in order to generate capital in return for the
tax credits, the costs of raising capital incurred by using channels and intermediaries
must be borne. However, at the same time there are a number of positive features
which the tax credit program introduces. The presence of investors, who face
penalties should the property not comply with the tenant income and rent guidelines,
introduces a healthy tension with respect to the developer. Investors provide a
balancing force to check developer excesses. There are a number of services which
intermediaries provide in evaluating the feasibility of properties and in monitoring the
health of the properties and the developers. These roles are typically overlooked;
" For example, the General Accounting Office testimony on Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit Utilization and Syndication dated April 27, 1990 reflects many of
the difficulties encountered in evaluating the efficiency of the program. The
lack of accurate and complete data leads to using theoretical constructions of
questionable relevance. As a result, the analysis raises more questions than
it answers.
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intermediaries are simply viewed as costs of raising capital. While there are stories
of success and failure on the part of both the public sector and the private sector for
previous public housing programs, the private sector role in the LIHC program
provides a focus on economic realities and a freedom from political pressures to ignore
the economic realities. Both of these elements have been lacking in some housing
programs managed by the public sector.
Certainly there have been important lessons learned from the operation of the
housing tax credit program. As noted above, the oversight and corrective role of
intermediaries and investors which the structure of the industry provides is useful.
In addition, there appear to be many valuable lessons learned from the decentralized
nature of the program, which is administered in many respects by state and local
governments. State agencies have generally done an excellent job of tailoring the
program to meet their own needs and policy priorities. These lessons should be
applied to future housing programs.
Finally, on the subject of the efficiency of the program, it is interesting to
speculate on the reaction of Congress and other policymakers to the success
SunAmerica has had in pricing their tax credit product with the request for proposals
format. Some in the industry have expressed concern that the enormous profits
earned will undermine support for the program. It might be argued, however, that
while the short term result was high profits for one firm, in the longer term it may
significantly improve the efficiency of the program. Presumably developers will learn
of the large profits and will use their leverage, in controlling the supply of scarce tax
credit properties, to negotiate a piece of those profits in the form of higher prices. It
also seems likely that other firms will develop a guaranteed product, and compete for
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properties using some of the profits available. The price paid for tax credit properties
will rise, further improving the efficiency of the low income housing credit program.
Eventually, the extraordinary profits to SunAmerica will be eliminated, but the
market-wide impact on the efficiency of the program will remain.
Section 8.4 The Status of the Tax Credit Industry
The discussion in this chapter so far focusses on how the industry has
developed, particularly over the past two years. The final section of this chapter,
below, discusses where the industry may go from here. Before moving on to a
discussion of where the industry goes from here, it will be useful to discuss two
aspects of the status of the industry: is the LIHC program is accomplishing its policy
objectives; and what are the risks of an investment in tax credits?
8.4.1 Is the Tax Credit Program Achieving Its Objectives?
All indications are that the low income housing credit has achieved the
objectives of the program - producing good quality affordable housing for a targeted
population over a long period of time. In part, this success must be attributed to the
lessons learned from earlier housing programs and incorporated into the program.
For example, the LIHC program makes enormous strides in addressing the several
problems from previous housing programs which were identified by Congress.
For the most part, the evidence of how well the program is working is
anecdotal, in that a comprehensive review of how well the program is performing has
not been undertaken. In fact, such a review would likely first require improved data
collection about the program. One of the disadvantages of decentralizing the program
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to state and local governments has been that complete, centralized data about the
program and the properties has not been available.
As noted in Chapter 3, the program has been extended four separate times by
legislation. Each expiration of the program provided Congress with an opportunity
to terminate the program, if it were not working. In connection with legislation,
Congress has reviewed the program and held several hearings, with extensive
testimony by a range of industry participants, state government officers, and
policymakers. The conclusion to date has been that the program is working.
The 600,000 apartment units produced today make the LIHC program one of
the largest Federal housing programs ever created. Clearly this also provides
evidence that the property market and the developers have functioned effectively,
under the program, in producing affordable housing. The recent changes in the equity
capital market should improve the industry's ability to provide decent, safe housing
for more Americans.
Of course, there is still room to improve the program. The National Realty
Committee, a broad-based real estate industry organization, proposes the following:
Among the structural changes to the LIHTC program that policymakers should
consider are proposals to raise to $25,000 the value of tax credits that an
individual may apply against income taxes; to reduce the negative effect of the
Alternative Minimum Tax on a taxpayer's ability to use these credits; and to
allow the tax credit benefits to "flow" to the investor sooner than is currently
allowed. ... Modifications such as these would dramatically increase the
amount of capital raised under the LIHTC program and, thereby, increase the
production of needed affordable housing."
National Realty Committee, America's Real Estate: A National Policy Agenda,
January, 1994, p. 27.
Page 143
In fact, the steady progress at improving the program through legislation as well as
the increasing efficiency of the industry suggest that it is important to allow a housing
program time to develop and become more workable. In fact, a more stable and
consistent legislative environment might have allowed the industry to progress more
quickly.
8.4.2 Risks of an Investment in Tax Credits
There are a number of risks involved with an investment in tax credits.
Real estate risks. As with any real estate based asset, there are risks around
the development and operation of the property. Will construction be completed? Will
the property succeed in leasing to qualified tenants at the required rents? Will the
property remain viable over the investment holding period? Because most
intermediaries require that tax credit properties charge below-market rents, these
properties should be less exposed to market risks than a conventional property.
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 6, the developer of the property makes certain
guarantees which can mitigate some of the real estate risks. In addition, to the extent
that some of the risks for a set of properties are not correlated with each other, these
risks are diversifiable by investing in a pool of properties.
Although there is no comprehensive data available, the industry experience
since 1987 appears to be that there have been very few foreclosures. (Of course, firms
do not ordinarily publicize their failures.) There are properties in default of their
mortgage obligations, which are undergoing workouts but may ultimately end up
being foreclosed upon. However, so long as the property is not foreclosed upon, the
delivery of tax benefits will continue. The tax credit is based upon the cost of the
property, not the operations.
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Tax risks. Because this is a tax-oriented investment, obviously there are risks
associated with compliance with the tax law. Will the property generate the expected
amount of credits, at the expected time? Will the property qualify initially for tax
credits? Will the property maintain ongoing compliance? Will the investment
structure permit the pass-through of credits to investors from the property
investments?
The developer guarantees, particularly the adjustments to the price if credits
are less than anticipated, provide some protection against these risks. In addition,
all reputable intermediaries require an opinion from a qualified tax attorney prior to
making a property investment. There appears to have been little or no industry losses
from tax problems.
Management risks. Investors who entrust their capital to an intermediary
and/or developer obviously take a risk that party will fail to perform. Successful
development and operation of a tax credit property requires a certain level of
management skill.
Investors must not underestimate the importance of property
management in their strategic equations. Apartment complexes are
management-intensive, with hundreds of leases rolling over annually
and heavy wear and tear on units. Strong tenant relations are a must
for stemming tenant turnover, which can lead to re-leasing costs
averaging $1,000 to $1,500 per unit. Good management is also able to
recognize subtle market changes and balance rent hikes with the need
to maintain high occupancy.16
16 Real Estate Research Corporation and Equitable Real Estate Investment
Management, Inc., "Property Types in Perspective," Real Estate Report, Volume
22, No. 4, 1993, p. 15.
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In addition, there is the risk that the conflicts of interest between what is best for the
investor and what is best for the developer or intermediary may not get resolved
appropriately. Finally, there is always the risk of business failure or fraud on the
part of the management group. Two Farmers Home syndication firms, The March
Company and First American, have failed in the past several years. In addition, the
president of another syndicator, Citi-Equities, was recently indicted on fraud charges.
However, in the absence of fraud or bankruptcy, once again the anecdotal evidence
suggests that a high percentage of properties operate successfully. Of course, the
history of the program is not long enough to make this statement with any certainty,
as problems may not yet have appeared.
Investment risks. There are risks related to the process of investing funds.
Once the investor gives their capital to the intermediary, is the money put to work
quickly? Will the property investments made achieve the desired returns? Will the
property investments selected be consistent with the preferences of the investor?
A number of funds appear to have been adversely affected by the unexpected
growth in the market in 1993 and the resulting changes in prices for properties. This
resulted in those funds not achieving their yield objectives, by a significant amount.
Actual experience, therefore, suggests that the investment risks are material. This
may not be obvious to many investors, who naturally tend to focus on real estate and
tax risks.
In addition, there are other risks. The investor itself is one source of risk. Will
they have a continuing tax bill, so they can continue to use the credits and
deductions? In addition, Congress demonstrated with the 1986 tax act that there is
always an element of political risk in utilizing tax incentive programs. Finally, the
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oversight and regulation of the program exposes it to regulatory risks, should
government agencies make decisions which adversely affect the value or operation of
an investor's properties.
In summary, industry experience suggests that, if structured carefully, an
investment in tax credit properties has lower risk than many investors may initially
have expected. The recent decline in yields clearly reflects, in part, a perception by
investors that risk levels are fairly low. In effect, the decline in yields is eliminating
a extraordinary yield premium as investors' gain understanding of and experience
with the program.
Section 8.5 Possible Future Developments in the Industry
Discussing the changes to date does, of course, beg us to ask what changes
might be expected in the future. To some degree, understanding the structure of the
industry, the interrelationships which form a system, and the dynamics of that system
to date should form a useful basis for speculation as to how the industry might behave
in the future.
It seems reasonable to project that the following may occur: yields to investors
will fall further; at some point, this trend will stop; channels of distribution and
products will continue to change; one or two dominant products will develop; firms will
continue to enter the industry, and some firms will exit. The balance of this chapter
will further discuss these possibilities.
Lower yields. Current evidence suggests that the equity capital market still
has not found an equilibrium point which balances supply and demand. Despite the
lower yields to investors, and despite higher market interest rates, intermediaries
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report that the demand for their tax credit products continues to exceed the supply.
Of course, this implies that the price is still too low - that is, the yield is more than
the market requires. As noted above, the perception of lower risks is contributing to
the decline in yields. In the absence of some countervailing force in the market,
competitive forces will drive yields still lower. This will further improve the efficiency
of the program.
Reaching equilibrium. Of course, eventually the equity capital market will find
the balance of supply and demand. The increasing sophistication of industry
participants suggests that the market will move to a balance point more quickly than
it has in the past, as firms respond to competition more quickly. Of course, the
economic environment is not guaranteed to stay constant. If interest rates rise, or
corporate profitability drops, it will alter the price point at which supply and demand
balance. However, those forces would not appear to change the underlying dynamics.
The process of reaching a balance of supply and demand may be a painful one,
for three reasons. First, rapid market changes and increased competition add a level
of stress for firms operating in the market. They must make decisions and develop
products more quickly. It seems likely that some firms may not be up to the test, and
some will miscalculate in their decisions. Firms who succeed will have strong market
knowledge, an ability to learn quickly, and short product development times, as well
as the ability to recognize market excesses.
Second, certain features of the tax credit industry could allow the equity capital
and property markets to temporarily exceed their steady-state maximum size. As
noted in Chapter 3, credits which are not allocated to properties can, to a limited
degree, be carried forward and allocated in later years. To the extent that the
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industry has accumulated tax credit allocating authority which has been carried
forward from prior years, this might be allocated in a particular and generate a level
of industry activity which is not sustainable. This appears to have happened in 1993,
when $424 million of tax credit was allocated, well above the $319 million generated
from the per capita allowance for that year." It appears that approximately $120
million of credit allocating authority will be carried over into 1994, allowing the
industry to maintain its size or grow for at least another year. However, if all of the
credit which has been carried forward is allocated in 1994, how will the industry
behave in 1995? The process of adjusting the industry to a sustainable size could be
difficult for industry participants. This is an interesting example of the dynamics of
the system.
Third, for some time intermediaries have been operating in a market
environment which has been behaving in a predictable, linear fashion. Demand has
been rising, yields have been falling, and prices for tax credits have been rising for
two years. When that changes, will firms react appropriately? For example, if some
intermediary firms continue the escalation behavior described above past the point at
which investors will support the reduced yields, it may temporarily result in a
supply/demand imbalance which is the opposite of the current situation - prices will
be too high, not too low. Theoretically, the flow of equity capital would then slow or
stop until the market corrects. Similarly, developers have been operating in an
environment which has been steadily more favorable to them, with prices rising and
terms becoming more favorable. It is likely that downward price moves in the
"7 "Tax Credit Allocations Surge Upward in 1993," The Multifamily Advisor,
National Housing & Rehabilitation Association, Spring 1994, p. 3.
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property market will be sticky rather than smooth, as developers attempt to resist the
operation of market forces unfavorable to them. This could also disrupt the
functioning of the market for a time.
Pressure on intermediaries. Both investors and developers presently have a
high level of power, relative to the channels and intermediaries. This power, together
with the high level of rivalry among intermediaries, will put substantial pressure on
intermediaries to operate effectively. Operating effectively has two dimension:
responding with agility to changes in the market; and adding economic value
commensurate to the cost of their services. The result will likely be continued
changes in the channels of distribution and in the products offered in order to meet
the demands of the market.
Changes here may illustrate the partial convergence of the equity capital
market and the property market. Direct investment by corporations suggests that
intermediaries will not be allowed to take their market position for granted. Market
competition, from finders and other intermediaries, will require that their revenues
reflect the value they add. At the same time, the brokers who were once paid 4-5%
of the capital raised for finding corporate investors have now seen that merely finding
investors has little value in a market awash with investor capital. An understanding
of customer needs and knowledge of the market are the prerequisites to adding value
today. Intermediaries are looking at new ways to accomplish those tasks, or are
taking on those tasks themselves. Former channels of distribution are also looking
at taking on roles intermediaries once served, blurring the lines between the equity
capital market and the property market.
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Dominant products. The firms which can construct a value chain of products
and processes which makes the most attractive offer to developers will, of course,
succeed best at obtaining tax credits. In discussing the product life cycle, Porter notes
that in theory product innovation will ultimately reach a point where the optimal
product configuration is reached; this will become the dominant product in the
industry. 8 The pattern of product evolution in an industry may result from changes
in the scale of the industry, which permit new processes; learning about products;
learning about buyers; and diminishing returns to product innovation, among other
factors.19 Clearly the tax credit industry has seen product evolution, resulting in
part from changes in scale as well as learning about products and learning about
buyers.
However, the housing tax credit is different from many other industries in that
tax credits are a limited commodity. The capital needs of the industry are relatively
small, at $2 billion. Further, a portion of that capital is targeted to non-profit
developers. Given the current availability of capital in the industry, it seems
reasonable to envision a market in which all of the capital needs of the industry can
be met by one or two of the groups of investors which were described in Chapter 5.
If that is true, then it is likely that one or two dominant products will emerge. Again,
the dominant products will be those which have the most to offer the developer.
18 Porter, 1985, p. 194. Porter cautions that different industries show different
behavior; in some industries with undifferentiated products the dominant
design appears quickly. In other industries, product innovation continues
indefinitely.
19 Porter 1985, p. 195.
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Changes in intermediaries and channels. Offering the dominant products and
processes may require changes in the intermediaries and channels which presently
exist in the market. For example, if capital-intensive products and processes are
dominant, few of the intermediaries in the market today will be able to compete. It
seems a safe forecast to say that new firms will enter the industry; firms currently in
the market will need to change, some of them significantly; and that firms who do not
change will exit the industry, either voluntarily or involuntarily.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
The housing tax credit is the nation's principal program for producing
affordable housing. Substantially all of the new affordable housing created in recent
years has been financed, in part, with equity capital generated by the housing tax
credit. In addition, the roughly 100,000 to 120,000 units of new and rehabilitated
housing produced each year represent much of the current multifamily housing
production of any type in the United States. Therefore, the program generates a
significant amount of economic activity and impact as well. Housing Secretary Henry
G. Cisneros has stated that the tax credit supports 67,000 jobs and $1.7 billion in
wages each year.'
The housing tax credit industry has undergone rapid change in the past
twenty-four months, and that change continues. Industry participants continue to be
surprised by changes which occur, so it seems more than safe to say that few if any
of those industry participants anticipated the changes which have occurred. The
major economic changes in the industry to date - lower yields to investors, higher
prices for tax credits, and lower fees to brokers - have obviously affected different
industry participants unevenly. Investors and brokers have suffered. Developers
have benefitted. So have the state housing agencies and the public, because higher
prices for tax credits allow more units to be created with the fixed amount of tax
credit dollars which are available. To date, intermediaries have been less affected.
' "Revival of Tax Credit is Sought to Spur Low-Income Housing," The New York Times,
April 18, 1993, p. 35.
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However, it seems likely that at least some intermediaries will suffer loss of business
and lower margins as the industry continues to change.
It is striking to note that the primary forces which started and promoted the
changes in the industry were the actions of the industry participants who have been
most adversely affected. The economic environment and the legislative change
making the tax credit program permanent probably accelerated the pace of change,
but do not appear to have changed its course. Rather, the efforts by brokers to
increase the number of firms investing in the industry and to increase the number of
intermediaries which those investors invested with were major factors. Of course, the
decision by corporations to invest with multiple intermediaries was an associated and
substantial factor.
If brokers and investors had more fully understood the structure of the housing
tax credit industry, they might have anticipated that the actions which they took
would not have achieved their intended goals. However, it may be equally possible
that they would have taken the same actions, for two reasons. First, it might be
argued that, given the structure of the industry, the industry was not at an
equilibrium point, changes were inevitable, and the industry as it existed in 1992 was
not going to continue regardless of their actions. Generic thinking, one of the systems
thinking skills reviewed in Chapter 8, suggests that even if these particular
participants had not taken the actions they did, other similar firms would have, with
the same end results. However, because one of the principal goals of strategy is to
maintain above-average profits and returns for as long as possible, it may have been
possible for industry participants to attempt to coordinate industry efforts to sustain
high profits and returns, rather than take individual actions which ensured that
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profits and returns would be reduced. Second, it is likely that some of the brokers
made larger short-term profits by increasing their business volume before margins
began to fall. If the rate at which they were willing to trade away future longer-term
profits for greater immediate profits was high enough, then brokers may have made
the correct decision.
There are many instances discussed above in which the behavior of the
industry closely matches the classic models of market behavior set forth in the
literature of industry analysis. However, because the industry has not been carefully
analyzed, these classic market behaviors surprised many industry participants.
In addition to the economic changes resulting from increased capital
investment by corporations, five changes in the structure of the industry were noted:
a declining role for the individual investor; substantial changes in products,
distribution channels, and pricing; a convergence of the equity capital market and the
property market; increasing levels of sophistication; and changes in the economics and
efficiency of the program. These effects can be summarized by viewing the effects as
a transformation of the equity capital market, which began in 1992 and is still
continuing.
The two most important forces, besides the competitive forces unleashed by the
actions of industry participants, have been the increasing sophistication of firms in the
industry and the limitations on the size of the industry. These three forces together
explain much of the transformation of the industry and the effects which resulted
from it.
In the broadest sense, the changes as a whole may well be beneficial to the
industry. The increased efficiency in delivering capital for affordable housing should
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help sustain political support for the program. The increased sophistication of the
industry should mean that at least some firms will be better positioned to respond to
future changes that develop in the industry. Of course, what is good for the industry
as a whole may not be good for individual firms. It seems likely that some will suffer
significantly as the industry continues to change.
All indications are that the low income housing credit has achieved the
objectives of the program - producing good quality affordable housing for a targeted
population over a long period of time. The 600,000 apartment units produced today
make the LIHC program one of the largest Federal housing programs ever created.
In many ways, the lessons learned from earlier programs proved to be useful
experience in developing the low income housing program. The subsidy is targeted
to a selected tenant population, and is proportionate to the number of lower-income
households served. The design of the program has been improved by subsequent
legislation. The program has been effectively administered, at the Federal level, by
the Department of the Treasury. However, the most important lesson may be the role
of state governments.
States have succeeded in using the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
(Tax Credit) to achieve the objectives Congress intended in creating the
program in 1986 - to stimulate the development and preservation of
affordable apartments for low income people throughout the country. ...
Much of this success is due to the program's flexibility. States can
customize the program to provide Tax Credits to the kinds of projects
most needed in their communities, including projects designed for large
families, smaller scattered-site projects to revitalize neighborhoods, and
buildings with single-room occupancy (SRO) units for formerly homeless
individuals.2
2 Glenn D. Petherick, State Tax Credit Equity Funds: The New Capital Source for Low
Income Rental Housing, Washington, D.C., National Council of State Housing
Agencies, 1992, p. vii.
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The importance of the role of the states to making the program work cannot be
underemphasized. The states have a critical role in setting local housing priorities,
evaluating properties to determine if they further the state's housing goals, reviewing
the viability of properties, and ensuring that the subsidy benefits low-income people.
Developers, capital sources, and the state agencies have worked together to make the
program work well to date.
The recent changes in the equity capital market should improve the industry's
ability to help provide decent, safe housing for more Americans. In some ways, it has
taken some time for the equity finance portion of the industry to mature, inasmuch
as the tax credit has existed since 1987. In part, this is due to the highly complex set
of regulations used in the tax credit program. Further, it seems likely that the erratic
pattern of enabling legislation slowed the maturing of the industry. The lapses of
authorization and the last minute legislation required state agencies, developers, and
intermediaries to operate in fits and starts. This suggests two lessons. First,
successful housing programs will likely always be complex, if they are to achieve the
many constraints of policy objectives, efficiency, and flexibility. Second, complex
housing programs take time to become successful. They need to be steadily supported
by Congress and given time to mature.
A note of caution is necessary. As discussed in Chapter 7, the industry is
comprised of a large number of firms. No firm or small group of firms appears able
to exercise significant leadership, because they do not represent a significant share
of the market. With that industry structure, there are significant incentives for other
firms to push the boundaries of accepted behavior. It is easy to envision the pattern
of escalating competition resulting in excesses and poor business decisions. This, in
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turn, could undermine the investor confidence and political support needed to allow
the program, and the industry, to survive.
This point illustrates a principal tenet of systems thinking. The primary forces
driving the industry, and the primary threats to the industry, do not stem from
outside causes, such as changes in the economy or in real estate markets. Rather, the
structure of the industry - the structure of the system - is the source of the greatest
threats to the housing tax credit industry and its participants.
Further Research
This work has also raised some questions which could be the subject of further
research. While this work has described the housing tax credit industry and
conceptually explored the dynamics of the industry when viewed as a system, a more
formal analysis would be useful test of the conclusions reached herein. For example,
a systems dynamics model of the industry might be constructed to test the behavior
of the industry. Also, it has been noted that the efficiency of the industry, from a
public policy point of view, has substantially improved. More accurate measures of
the efficiency of the program would be useful for formulating future policy. In
addition, there has been relatively little analysis of how well the program is
succeeding in delivering affordable housing to the target population and the extent to
which the rents paid by tenants are lower than market rents. It appears that the
program is performing well, but no thorough analysis has been performed. Accurate
and complete data remains a formidable obstacle to understanding the housing tax
credit industry, measuring the impact of the program, and formulating good policy
decisions. Both the National Council of State Housing Agencies and the Department
of Housing and Urban Development have proposed more comprehensive data
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collection. Finally, the issue of understanding the impacts of production subsidies and
demand subsidies remains. William Apgar states that, "It is relatively simple to show
that the distributional effects of even small market price changes in nonentitlement
housing assistance programs may easily overwhelm the direct effects of the subsidy
for participants."' How much benefit accrues to low-income tenants? What effects
are there on the non-subsidized renter population? Do production programs lower
rents for all renters? These difficult questions remain unanswered.
a William C. Apgar, Jr., "Which Housing Policy is Best?", Housing Policy Debate,
Volume 1, Issue 1, 1990, p. 25.
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